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A variety of unexpected twists and turns along the highway of life led me in 
pursuit of a PhD. Few of those attending a performance in my previous life as a touring 
musician would ever imagine me obtaining a doctoral degree (though I always looked the 
part). Yet those experiences somehow deposited me at a temp administrative assistant 
position at Rutgers University that then transported me to an administrative coordinator 
position with the Jerome Fisher Program in Management & Technology at the University 
of Pennsylvania. This allowed me to enroll in graduate-level courses and my first choice 
was Marybeth Gasman’s History of Higher Education. This class convinced me to 
become a professor, a researcher, a teacher, and not a college administrator.  
I met with Marybeth towards the end of that semester. I told her I wanted to apply 
for the master’s program (as I was a lowly general admit at that point). She said I would 
have no trouble getting accepted. I told her I wanted to get a master’s degree and then 
pursue a PhD. She asked if I was awesome. I responded, ‘Um, I don’t know, sure.’ She 
declared: “Then you will get in.” Though far from amazing, I convinced Marybeth to be 
my advisor. I owe a weighty debt of gratitude to Marybeth for her unwavering support 
and constant inspiration.  
After beginning the master’s, I met Joni Finney during by her finance class. Her 
Advanced Public Policy Research Seminar made me a convert to the study of public 
policy. Joni has been instrumental in my research focus. She’s been a trusted friend and 




first ASHE in 2013. Despite declining an invitation to work with Nick as a PhD student 
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, he has continued to be unbelievably gracious 
with his time and insight. Marybeth, Joni, and Nick not only comprise my dissertation 
committee- they are the three most influential mentors in my journey and I can’t thank 
them enough. 
 My colleagues at the Center for Minority Serving Institutions have also been a 
steady source of dialogue, support, and comic relief. Former PhD students and now 
tenure-track faculty members Andrés Castro Samayoa and Thai-Huy Nguyen have given 
much of their time and wisdom. Conversations with current doctoral students Amanda 
Washington-Lockett, Daniel Blake, Andrew Martinez, Lola Esmieu, and Will Anyu have 
had a tremendous impact on my thinking on all issues related to MSIs and beyond. I also 
credit my cohort- Roman Ruiz and Ed Smith- as being constant sources of insight and 
support as we’ve trudged through the highs and lows of PhD life.  
 Through it all, my wife Lisa has given me more support than any spouse should. 
She’s endured my struggles and seven-day weeks of work for months on end. Many 
doctoral students I’ve known have hit rocky terrain in relationships given the formidable 
demands on time and attention. Yet Lisa has been happy to accept a day out consisting of 
hours spent at a coffee shop while we work together. I could never have begun a PhD or 
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Minority serving institutions (MSIs) are becoming an increasingly prominent part of U.S. 
postsecondary education and perform a critical role in educating and graduating students 
of color. These institutions receive discretionary and mandatory funding via the Higher 
Education Act to better serve their focal student populations. While a growing corpus of 
research illuminates the strengths of MSIs, few studies have focused on the possible 
relationship between MSI federal grants and student outcomes. This study incorporates 
institution-level Department of Education NCES data and Equality of Opportunity 
Project data with a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of Title III and 
Title V grants on college completion measures as well as upward social mobility 
measures. The results from this study indicate a positive relationship between institutions 
receiving MSI grant funding and institutional outcome metrics net of other variables. The 
relationship is particularly strong amongst Latino/a students graduating from HSIs. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Generations have believed in the perception and the reality of the American 
Dream. This concept has arguably been the most enduring and intrinsic characteristic to 
what it means to be a citizen of the United States. Though definitions may vary, most 
would agree that the American Dream is the economic process of upward income 
mobility. It is the concept that children can and should enjoy a higher standard of living 
than their parents. Since the middle of the 20th century, a college degree exists in the 
minds of many as the key to unlocking the door to the American Dream and achieving at 
minimum a middle class standard of living. Yet children's prospects of earning more than 
their parents have fallen from 90 percent to 50 percent over the past half century. Given 
the decline in aggregate income mobility, it is critical to assess how specific 
postsecondary institutions and public policies serve students. This study is an attempt to 
explore a federal public policy arguably adopted and implemented to serve an equity 
agenda.    
The shifting demographics of the United States are changing the shape of higher 
education to come. As of 2011, more people of color were born in the U.S. than Whites. 
The White population is projected to become a minority by the middle of the 21st century. 
The demographic changes have already led to friction, particularly at the levels of state 
and federal politics. These changes are both racial and generational in nature. White is 
not the future of the U.S. Births of Asian American and Pacific Islanders and Latino/as 
already outpace Whites. Between 1980 and 2010, the U.S. population grew by 40 




246 percent, American Indian and Alaska Native by 106 percent, Black and African 
Americans by 50 percent, and Whites by 29 percent (Conrad & Gasman, 2015). Despite 
the demographic changes, the political reality has not caught up with the demographic 
reality. There is a cultural generational gap between policymakers and the residents of an 
increasing number of U.S. states. Though the tension is often criticized as the 
manifestation of festering racist attitudes, Frey (2015) argues, “It reflects the social 
distance between minority youth and an older population that does not feel a personal 
connection with young adults and children who are not ‘their’ children and 
grandchildren” (p. 7). The growing populations of color throughout the U.S. portend in 
increase in the number of minority serving institutions (MSIs). 
MSIs compromise more than 600 postsecondary colleges and universities in the 
U.S. and U.S. territories. MSIs accounted for approximately 15 percent of all 
postsecondary institutions and enrolled 26 percent of all college students in 2013-2014 
(about 3.8 million students) (Gasman & Conrad, 2013; Montenegro & Jankowski, 2015; 
U.S. Department of Education, 2014). MSIs served approximately 40 percent of 
underrepresented students totaling approximately 3.8 million students in the same 
academic year (U.S. Department of Education, 2014). MSIs were initially founded in 
response to the exclusion of racial minorities from U.S. colleges and universities. An 
institution can be designed as an MSI if a percentage of the student population exceeds a 
particular number (usually 25 percent) and is then eligible for federal funding. 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and Tribal Colleges and 




an education in the traditional colleges and universities of the day. MSIs continue to 
provide an education to all students regardless of race and ethnicity. 
Since an institution can become an MSI after meeting two benchmarks (the 
percentage of enrollment that is a particular population of color and the percentage that 
receives Pell Grants), it is certain that the number of MSIs will rise given the increase in 
populations of color. Table 1 displays the eligibility criteria and legislation for the MSI 
categories included in this study.  
 
Table 1:  
 









Alaska Native Native 
Hawaiian Serving 
Institutions








Asian American Native 
American Pacific Islander 
Serving Institutions 
 §§ 320(b) and 
371(c)(2) of the HEA, 











Part B of the HEA, 20 
U.S. Code § 1067q
Hispanic Serving 
Institutions
§502 of the HEA, 20 
U.S.C. §1101a
25% Hispanic 
students 50% low income
Native American Non-
Tribal Serving Institutions
§§319(b) and 371(c)(8) 
of the HEA; 20 U.S.C. 







§§318(b) and 371(c)(9) 
of the HEA; 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1059e(b) and 
1067q(c)(9)
40% Black 
students 50% low income
Tribal Colleges & 
Universities





Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education 
 
The federal government formally recognized MSIs with the Higher Education Act 
of 1965. Under Title III, HBCUs began receiving federal funding (Gasman and Conrad, 
2013; U.S. Department of Education, 2013). TCUs were appropriated funding by the 
federal government beginning in 1994 (Stull, Spyridakis, Gasman, Samayoa, & Booker, 
2015). HBCUs and TCUs were founded specifically to educate African American and 
Native American student populations respectively. Additional classifications of 
postsecondary institutions as MSIs developed to address the increasing presence of 
students of color and low-income students in many colleges and universities throughout 
the U.S. Eligibility criteria for such federal funding occurred first for HSIs in 1998. Other 
categories followed with the passage of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act in 
2007 (Stull, Spyridakis, Gasman, Samayoa, & Booker, 2015).  
MSIs receive federal funding through Titles III and V of the Higher Education 
Act. These include mandatory and discretionary components, with grants for all MSI 
categories besides HBCUs and TCUs being competitive. Many categories of MSIs can 
also apply for cooperative grants between multiple institutions, though the lead institution 
must be designated as an MSI. There are numerous functions that can be funded through 
MSI grants. A common use of MSI federal funding is academic support. Another use of 
MSI funding is the purchase of scientific equipment or improving classrooms and 
libraries. Another popular utilization of federal funding is for instruction and curriculum 
development (Harmon, 2012). The federal government appropriated roughly $762 




for these institutions to invest in the advancement of student success. As there is at this 
time no common definition of student success, institutions continue to devote this 
resource to a variety of projects. The goals of such projects could include an increase in 
student persistence or completion of a degree. Other programs may encourage students to 
advance from remedial education into college-level coursework (Boland, 2018).  
Table 2:  
Total Title III and Title V funding to MSIs 
 
Source: Hegji, A. (2016). Programs for Minority-Serving Institutions Under the Higher 
Education Act. Congressional Research Service. 
 
Institutions submit project abstracts to the Office of Postsecondary Education. 
There is a two-step process for institutions to received federal funding as an MSI. First, 
an institution must submit an application to be considered eligible to apply for a federal 
MSI grant. Once granted permission, the institution then applies for a grant. The project 
abstract is part of that process. The project abstract outlines what an institution intends to 
do with the grant and in most cases, the desired results. Project abstracts often include 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
AANAPISI discretionary $2,500,000 $3,600,000 $3,198,590 $2,731,369 $2,953,761 $3,001,488 $2,942,044
AANAPISI mandatory $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $4,731,162 $4,640,000
AANH discretionary $11,579,000 $15,084,000 $13,412,000 $12,859,000 $12,186,000 $12,622,000 $12,833,000
AANH mandatory $15,000,000 $15,000,000 $15,000,000 $15,000,000 $14,235,000 $13,920,000 $13,905,000
HSI discretionary $93,256,000 $117,429,000 $104,395,000 $100,432,000 $95,179,000 $98,583,000 $100,231,000
HSI mandatory - - - - - - -
HSI_III d - - - - - - -
HSI_III m - $100,000,000 $100,000,000 $100,000,000 $94,900,000 $92,800,000 $92,700,000
NASNTI discretionary $0 $3,600,000 $3,199,000 $3,199,000 $2,956,000 $3,062,000 $3,348,000
NASNTI mandatory $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $5,000,000 $4,745,000 $4,640,000 $4,660,000
PBI discretionary $0 $10,801,000 $9,262,000 $8,778,000 $9,092,000 $9,244,000 $9,942,000
PBI mandatory $15,000,000 $15,000,000 $15,000,000 $14,235,000 $13,920,000 $13,905,000 $13,980,000
HBCU discretionary $238,095,000 $266,568,000 $227,980,000 $216,056,000 $223,783,000 $227,524,000 $244,694,000
HBCU mandatory $85,000,000 $85,000,000 $85,000,000 $80,665,000 $78,880,000 $78,795,000 $79,220,000
TCU discretionary $23,158,000 $30,169,000 $25,713,000 $24,368,000 $25,239,000 $25,662,000 $27,599,000
TCU mandatory $30,000,000 $30,000,000 $30,000,000 $28,470,000 $27,840,000 $27,810,000 $27,960,000
Discretionary total $368,588,000 $447,251,000 $387,159,590 $368,423,369 $371,388,761 $379,698,488 $401,589,044
Mandatory total $155,000,000 $155,000,000 $155,000,000 $148,370,000 $144,620,000 $143,801,162 $144,365,000




information required for eligibility:  total enrollment, number of Pell recipients, number 
of part-time students, and total core expenses (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.). 
Though not required, project abstracts can include specific numeric targets for intended 






















Table 3:  
Examples of HEA Title III and V MSI Grant-Funded Projects 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education 
MSI 
Category Institution Program Purpose FY




Recruit, prepare, and guide more 
Southeast Asian American (SEAA) 
students to seize the opportunity to enroll 
at Evergreen Valley College (EVC) and 
complete major steps toward their 
personal goals for academic excellence
2015
AANAPISI Coastline Community College
New Asian American 
Pacific Islander (AAPI) 
Generation Initiative 
(NAAPIGI)
Improve the persistence and time to 
completion rates to match or exceed state 
averages for AAPI students.  It will also 
seek to significantly increase the number 






Increasing the Academic Capacity of 
Chaminade University of Honolulu 2014
ANNH Leeward Community College
Pa‘a Ke Kahua: 
Strengthening Our 
Foundation
Increase success, graduation and transfer 
rates at Leeward Community College by 
improving the quality of facilities and 






FYI - First Year Institute
implement research-based strategies to 
develop a college culture that promotes, 
expedites, and values student success 
among Hispanic and high-need students
2016
HSI Bergen Community College
Pathway Scholars 
Program
Learning-enhancement  and proactive 
advising strategies will be integrated 
through the Pathway Scholars Program 
(PSP) to support high-need Hispanic and 
low-income students as they transition 
from developmental to college-level 
courses
2016
NASNTI Fort Lewis College
Address the needs of Native American 
students who are retaining and graduating 







Merging Tradition and 
Technology to Create 
Access to High-Demand 
Careers
Distance delivery to increase 
postsecondary completion rates 2011
PBI Community College of Philadelphia
Achieve higher levels of academic 
performance and persistence rates of 
African-American male members of the 
Center of Male Engagement
2009
PBI Mississippi Delta Community College PATHMAKERS
Assess, develop, and implement 
educational support and mentoring 
strategies to consistently increase the 
persistence rate among African-American 







I argue that Title III and Title V funding for MSIs represents an attempt to fulfill 
an equity agenda via public policy as manifested in postsecondary finance policy 
intervention. These policies target institutions enrolling a disproportionate composition of 
students of color and low-income students (Conrad & Gasman, 2015; Hegji, 2016). 
Through these policies, the federal government specifically distributes grants to 
institutions acknowledged to be financially disadvantaged (Hegji, 2016). The purpose of 
this study is to investigate if these policies achieve their purpose: enabling traditionally 
underserved students to earn a college credential and enjoy a higher standard of living. 
MSIs are located in all sectors of higher education, though more tend to be these 
open-access institutions. A popular critique of open-access higher education institutions- 
those admitting the majority of applicants- is that they do a disservice to their students. 
Some researchers argue that students of color are especially harmed by enrolling in and 
graduating from this tier of college. Yet both old and new studies counter with empirical 
research findings of positive outcomes for students attending community colleges and 
less-selective four-year colleges (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 2017). It is 
critical to empirically assess the efficacy of MSIs and other open-access institutions to 
determine if their graduates advance in terms of income mobility. Some researchers have 
argued that less selective institutions corral people of color in lower-wage employment. 
Sociologists have long critiqued U.S. higher education for maintaining systems of 
hierarchy grounded in race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (Grusky, 2014; Grodsky 




a more nuanced view of the mechanisms by which less selective institutions serve 
students is warranted (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 2017).  
This study contributes to the research literature on MSIs, college completion, 
upward social mobility, and federal public policy for higher education. It seeks to answer 
the following questions:  
1. Is there a relationship between Title V and Title III funding for MSIs and 
college completion? Do outcomes vary between postsecondary sectors and across 
credentials? 
2. Is there a relationship between Title V and Title III funding for MSIs and 
upward social mobility? Do MSIs contribute to the stratification of U.S. higher education 
by not increasing upward mobility for their students? 
The federal government provides funding to institutions of higher education that 
serve a disproportionate share of students of color and lower income students to support 
the success of these students. The core assumption is that bolstering such institutions will 
enable them to better serve students. Also implicit in this federal policy intervention is 
that higher education should have as its primary mission the education and graduation of 
its students. It is essential to empirically determine if MSIs produce more students 
completing credentials as well as leading to an increase in upward mobility to better 
understand the impact of key Higher Education Act policies on traditionally underserved 
student populations. The results from this study could illuminate the impact of Title V 
and Title III grants on minimizing gaps in college completion and economic mobility 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Examining MSI performance requires an analysis of federal higher education 
policy. Like all higher education institutions, MSIs are situated within the context of 
higher education in the state as well as overall federal policies for higher education. 
Higher education policy research has well demonstrated historical hurdles to enrollment 
for students of color (Perna & Kurban, 2013; St. John & Musoba, 2011). Education 
research has also analyzed why many who access higher education do not complete their 
education (St. John & Musoba, 2011). This research repeatedly connects the problems of 
access and attainment to increasing costs of education for students and families, declining 
purchasing power of financial aid, state disinvestment in higher education via diminished 
state appropriations, and lack of preparation in elementary and secondary education 
(Paulsen & Smart, 2001; Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2012).  
Despite the plethora of literature assessing state and federal higher education 
policy and the impact on individual institutions and students, little of it explores how 
such policies affect MSIs. Demographic shifts portend a substantial increase in the 
number of MSIs throughout the country in the near future. Studying how state and federal 
public policies affect MSIs- especially in terms of performance- is critical for state and 
nationwide efforts to address critical needs.   
MSIs were born from a grassroots response to institutional and political neglect. 
MSIs are emblematic of an activist spirit and a communal desire to wrest the reins of 
education from a racist, hegemonic legacy. While the dominant narratives in education 




“traditionally underrepresented/underserved communities,” such research exists almost 
entirely in a contextual vacuum. Such research mostly frames access and attainment 
issues in economic terms, while ignoring notions of social justice or the important role of 
political influence. Enrolling Black, Hispanic, Native American, and other students of 
color appears more often as a matter of economic and workforce needs within most 
education policy studies, with little to no mention of how these populations have 
historically been intentionally, systematically, and purposely barred from postsecondary 
education. Additionally, there is no analysis or even cursory mention of the 
institutionalized racism that continues to create the social ills and education attainment 
consequences so prevalent in U.S. society. 
This study is informed by several strands of research literature. This includes 
social mobility, higher education finance, college access, attainment, and return on 
investment, and social stratification.  
Social Mobility 
 
 At the heart of an individual’s decision to enroll in college is the desire for 
upward social mobility. Since at least the G.I. Bill of 1944 and later the Higher Education 
Act of 1965, higher education came to be perceived as the key essential for unlocking the 
door to a middle class lifestyle. The expansion of postsecondary education throughout the 
second half of the 20th century altered perceptions on the minimal requirements of 
obtaining a modest standard of living in the U.S. More importantly, the proliferation of 
both the structural as well as perceived importance of a college degree transformed the 




There is little debate that higher education changed the landscape of U.S. society and it 
did so based on the promise of upward social mobility. Parents wanted a better material 
standard of living for their children or sought to maintain that standard of living through 
colleges and universities.   
More significantly, higher education is perceived as the gateway to the American 
Dream. Haskins (2008) captures the common American attitude toward the purpose of 
higher education when he states: “The road to achieving the American Dream passes 
through the schoolhouse door” (p. 91). This sentiment reflects much of the higher 
education research on the economic mobility function of colleges and universities. In 
economic terms, this is viewed as one of several positive externalities of a college degree 
or credential.  
The economic mobility function of higher education benefited most native-born 
Americans throughout the twentieth century. Isaacs (2008) notes that two out of three 
native-born Americans earned more than their parents did 30 years before. She also states 
that lower-income children will likely make more than their parents. Yet Sawhill (2008) 
tempers such optimism by suggesting that while Americans appear to be gaining 
somewhat in relative terms, family income growth has slowed and economic growth has 
not benefitted all. Family income remains one of the most significant determinants of a 
student’s success in college and beyond (Haskins, 2008). Economic mobility is thus most 
predicated on a student’s background.  
Recent research by the Equality of Opportunity Project on upward social mobility 




institutions of higher education prioritized mobility, particularly for lower-income 
students and students of color. Their observational statistics demonstrate 
disproportionately high rates of mobility in colleges not categorized as highly selective 
based on incoming student standardized test scores (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & 
Yagan, 2017). The “engines of upward mobility” consist of a substantial number of MSIs 
(Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 2017). Intergenerational mobility is defined 
at the institutional level as the percentage of students coming from families in the bottom 
income quintile and advancing to the top quintile. The actual rate is calculated through 
multiplying the fraction of low-income students by the number of those students who 
reach the highest income quintile (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 2017). 
MSI Access, Attainment, and Return on Investment 
 
State and federal lawmakers across the country have responded to the call of 
college completion (Complete College America, 2012; National Center for Public Policy 
and Higher Education, 2008; Obama, 2009). They have tasked the nation’s colleges and 
universities with boosting the number of college graduates (Baum, Ma, & Payea, 2013; 
OECD, 2013). Fueling the college completion drive is the swiftly shifting demographics 
of the U.S. Those student populations traditionally underrepresented in higher education 
(students of color and low-income students) are precisely those essential to increasing 
degree attainment rates. It is worth recognizing that the participation, persistence, 
completion, and success of students of color are critical missions beyond fulfilling 
economic and workforce goals. All students regardless of class, color, and gender deserve 




Institutions (MSIs) have provided this opportunity to students historically underserved by 
U.S. postsecondary institutions. While researchers have largely ignored connections 
between public policy and MSI outcomes, much of the extant higher education research 
on MSI completion and attainment provides needed context for assessing how these 
institutions serve students. 
MSI Completion and Attainment 
Gaps in completion based on racial and ethnic student populations have been well 
documented. A substantial portion of the extant research on college completion examines 
selective institutions (Bound, et al., 2010; Bowen et al., 2009; Kurlaender and Felts, 
2008; Melguizo, 2010; Turner, 2004). Less focus has been placed on completion in 
nonselective four and two-year institutions. These are precisely those institutions that 
disproportionately enroll minority students. Recent work has begun to evaluate 
completion in MSIs (Flores & Park, 2013, 2014; Park, Flores, & Ryan, 2016; Nuñez, 
Richards and Awokoya, 2012; Strayhorn, 2008, 2016), though the bulk of such research 
tends towards qualitative and descriptive lenses. The research also tends to focus on 
specific MSI categories and not a combination of these types (Flores & Park, 2013, 2014; 
Park, Flores, & Ryan, 2016; Nuñez, Richards and Awokoya, 2012; Strayhorn, 2008, 
2016). MSI completion research has increasingly emphasize the role of STEM education 
and completion (Crisp et al., 2009, Hurtado et al., 2011; Malcom and Dowd, 2012). 
Given the exponential increase in MSIs and the number of students attending 
them, assessments of MSI completion are essential. The number of MSIs rose from 414 




colleges and universities, yet enroll 21.9% of all students and 60.8% of all Hispanic 
students (Hispanic Association of Colleges & Universities, 2016). Researchers have 
documented some of the attainment gains of the various MSIs: 
• Of the top 20 institutions that award science and engineering degrees to Asians or 
Pacific Islanders, seven identify as AANAPISIs (Gasman & Conrad, 2013). 
• Ten HBCUs are among the top 20 institutions that award science and engineering 
degrees to Blacks (Gasman & Conrad, 2013). 
• HBCUs enrolled 8 percent and graduated 18 percent of all Black students in U.S. 
higher education (2013) (NCES, n.d.).  
• More than a third of black STEM PhD holders earned their undergraduate degrees 
at HBCUs (Upton & Tanenbaum, 2014). 
• 10 HSIs are among the top 20 institutions that award science and engineering 
degrees to Hispanics/Latinos (Gasman & Conrad, 2013). 
Additionally, Flores & Park (2014) employed advanced quantitative methods to 
determine if there was a difference in completion measures between students enrolled in 
four-year MSIs in Texas compared to students attending four-year non-MSIs in Texas. 
They specifically looked at six-year baccalaureate degree completion for Hispanic and 
Black students. They found that there was no statistically significant difference after 
controlling for institutional selectivity between graduation rates between MSIs and non-






Culturally Relevant Pedagogy 
Prior research on the cultural significance of MSIs suggest that improved minority 
student outcomes can be partly explained by the degree in which MSIs embody an 
organizational identity that mirrors and privileges the values and backgrounds of their 
target population (e.g. HSIs and Latino/as) (Davis, 1991; Palmer & Gasman, 2008).  
Unlike many public four-year non-MSIs, MSIs develop programs that acknowledge 
cultural and community backgrounds of their students (Hubbard & Stage, 2009; Perna et 
al., 2009). Research has demonstrated the positive impact of students learning from and 
working with faculty and staff who share and understand students’ backgrounds (Hirt, 
Strayhorn, Amelink, & Bennett, 2006). Important for college completion, MSIs provide 
information to assist students in navigating both college social mores and program 
requirements (Brown & Davis, 2001; Gasman, Baez, & Turner, 2000). Arguably the most 
significant role MSIs play in furthering student success is developing a nurturing 
environment and strong community (students, staff, faculty, and alumni) that is critical 
for the success of students within and beyond their time as an MSI student (Conrad & 
Gasman, 2015). 
A rising concern in MSI research literature is determining if a federally 
designated MSI embraces its identity as an MSI. This research is beginning to connect 
the degree to which an institution works to serve its students of color or merely enrolls 
them (Malcom-Piqueux, 2013). Proponents of MSIs argue that such institutions more 
successfully educate and graduate students when it provides support programs aimed at 




(Contreras & Contreras, 2014; Malcom-Piqueux, 2013). There continues to be much 
debate about how institutions can best and most fully advance themselves as an MSI. 
This is truer for AANAPISIs and HSIs as these institutions for the most part were not 
founded to serve students as an MSI (though the issues surrounding identity also play out 
in HBCUs and TCUs to a lesser extent) (Allen and Jewell, 2002; Marklein, 2014; US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).     
Research on MSIs reveals the impact of federally funded grant programs that 
target specific student of color populations. The majority of these studies are qualitative 
and explore the benefits to students of culturally driven pedagogies, support services, and 
course work (Conrad & Gasman, 2015; Gasman, Nguyen, & Conrad, 2015; Gasman, 
Baez, & Turner, 2008; Ladson-Billings, 1995; Morrison, Robbins, & Rose, 2008; Palmer 
& Gasman, 2008). Culturally relevant pedagogies emphasize the cultural empowerment 
of a student’s background and community. By its nature, such an approach is infused 
with an adherence to social justice inequities (Garcia & Okhidoi, 2015; Ladson-Billings, 
1995). They also have been shown to strengthen student learning and boost student 
outcomes (Gay, 2010; Ginsberg & Wlodkowski, 2009). Often these modes of learning 
include innovative approaches to instruction, such as flipped classrooms and 
incorporating the students’ lived environments (Magolda & King, 2004; Teranishi, et al., 
2016). 
MSI Return on Investment 
The dominant narrative of U.S. higher education public policy is the increase of 




to graduate more students to bolster the economic competitiveness of the U.S. in the 
future knowledge-based economy (Carnevale & Rose, 2015). Students and families, 
along with lawmakers and state leaders, demand evidence of a positive return on 
investment for taxpayer dollars invested in public higher education. While institutions 
must be held accountable for the quality of education and services they provide, it is 
imperative that various measures that affect institutions be evaluated closely to determine 
if they fulfill their purpose in a manner that does not negatively impact students.  
Given their history serving a higher proportion of underprepared and under-
resourced students, MSIs tend to show lower completion rates than other institutions. 
This is a cause for concern when external entities hold MSIs to the same standard as 
better-resourced institutions, particularly when state funding is tied to outcome measures 
(performance-based funding). This does not excuse MSIs from being responsible for the 
performance and quality of their education and service to their students. To satisfy 
policymaker as well as student and community expectations, MSIs must demonstrate 
their capacity to provide an education that leads to a credential or measurable outcome.  
Though an increasing body of literature explores the relationship between 
institution attended and workforce earnings amongst minority graduates, almost no 
research has investigated how these factors play out in MSIs. Some researchers have 
assessed race and economic outcomes in flagship institutions (Andrews, Li, & 
Lovenheim, 2012, 2014; Hoekstra, 2009). Others have compared institutional selectivity 
to graduate workforce earnings (Brewer & Ehrenberg, 1996; Brewer et al., 1999; Dale & 




Research on the return on investment (ROI) of higher education has increased, 
particularly given policymaker and intermediary organization demands for such 
information. While research focusing exclusively on MSI ROI remains scant, it is 
growing. Much of this research is distinct from attainment or completion research in that 
the outcome variable of interest is workforce earnings instead of credential completion. 
Several recent studies commissioned by the Center for Minority Serving Institutions at 
the University of Pennsylvania explored the ROI of the more common MSI categories. 
These include assessments of AANAPISIs, HBCUs, HSIs, and TCUs.  
In their paper assessing the impact of a federally funded learning community 
program at an AANAPISI community college, Teranishi, et al. (2016) demonstrate that 
the program substantially boosted degree attainment, increased transfer to four-year 
institutions, and lessened students’ time to advance from developmental to college-level 
classes. 
Park, Flores, & Ryan (2015) and Strayhorn (2015) tackle the topic of workforce 
ROI in MSIs. Park, Flores, & Ryan (2015) found that Latino graduates of HSIs have 
earnings comparable to Latinos from non-HSIs, after controlling for institutional 
selectivity. Meanwhile, Strayhorn (2015) demonstrated that HBCU graduates show 
positive returns on investment in occupational status and Black identity after controlling 
for institutional selectivity. This follows an earlier study wherein HBCU Black graduates 
were found to be at a slight disadvantage in workforce earnings when compared to Black 
graduates of non-HBCUs (Strayhorn, 2008). For the most part, these studies dispel the 




institutions suffering from low completion rates and ill-equipping them for the labor 
market (Harmon, 2012). 
Such research demonstrates the potential for routine evaluations of federal grant-
funded programs to reveal whether or not MSIs outperform non-MSIs in graduating 
students of color. Teranishi et al. (2016) provides a framework for conducting such 
rigorous assessment. Program evaluation offers MSIs a critical opportunity to rigorously 
document successful program characteristics. While program evaluations signal the 
strengths of MSIs to policymakers, they also measure the efficacy of MSI programs in 
supporting their students. 
Higher Education Finance 
 
The three primary components of higher education finance are state 
appropriations, tuition, and financial aid. Each affects institutions and students in 
different ways. Every state varies greatly in their approaches to finance policies, though 
many share similarities (especially neighboring or regional states). Much of the critical 
research on higher education finance discusses how the majority of the states fail to craft 
a coherent finance policy that coordinates each element into a harmonious union. This is 
further disrupted by the unwieldy suite of federal financial aid policies available to 
students, especially at MSIs. 
Critics of public policy of higher education often aver that state higher education 
priorities rarely align finance policies with public priorities. These priorities, such as 
access, affordability, persistence and equity, are routinely compromised by contradictory 




development of higher education finance and the disparate development of public policy 
for postsecondary education throughout the states.  
 One line of critical state financial policy research believes that state policy 
prioritizes public colleges and universities over students. This can be seen in the primary 
funding mechanisms available to state governments: allocating funds, substantial 
involvement in tuition-setting, and dispersing financial aid. The majority of funding goes 
to institutions favoring higher enrollments (Hauptman, 2011). Further complicating 
funding concerns is the competing objectives of all involved parties. The lack of 
coordination among the funding mechanisms leads to counterproductive results 
(Hauptman, 2011; Jones, 2003).  
The misalignment of priorities and policies stems in part from an ideological shift 
on the part of policymakers regarding the purpose of state support during the 1970s and 
1980s. Students and families began shouldering more of the financial burden for higher 
education (Hauptman, 2011). Many economists, politicians and critics of higher 
education began to question the validity of the state using public funds to pay for what 
many policymakers myopically defined as private benefits. As the middle class served as 
a political pawn in state and federal higher education funding decisions, merit aid 
supplanted state need-based aid in popular usage in the southern states. From the Georgia 
HOPE Program in 1993 to the American Opportunity Tax Credit in 1992 at the federal 
level, funding policies at the state and federal levels reflected a long-running emphasis on 
affordability and enrolling traditional undergraduate students as opposed to equity and 




State Investment in Higher Education 
States appropriating less funds to public higher education in the aggregate over 
time has been well documented (Doyle, 2007; McLendon, Hearn and Mokher, 2009; 
Tandberg, 2010). Public four-year institutions have responded to decreased state support 
by increasing tuition. Hence, students and families assume a larger share of the financial 
burden of earning a college degree at an ever-increasing rate (Paulsen and Smart, 2001). 
Between 1987 and 2012 tuition at a four-year public institution more than doubled, from 
an annual average of $2,588 to $5,189 (State Higher Education Executive Officers, 
2012). Baum, Ma, & Payea (2013) reports that tuition has more than tripled between 
1983-1984 and 2013-2014 in public four-year institutions and doubled in both public 
two-year and private nonprofit four-year institutions. Funding for Title III aid for 
institutional development programs, which support MSIs, declined from $651 million 
(2010) to $567 million (2013). Total revenue per FTE student is roughly $16,648 at four-
year MSIs compared to $29,833 at non-MSIs (Cunningham, Park, & Engle, 2014). 
Nuñez and Elizondo (2013) noted that HSIs on average received $3,446 per FTE 
compared to an average of $5,242 per FTE at other institutions (Hispanic Association of 
Colleges & Universities, 2012). They argue that funding inequity can contribute to lower 
graduation and retention rates. While an important addition to the research on MSI 
funding, this study did not disaggregate MSIs by sector (four and two-year or public and 
private) or selectivity. Other research has found that HSIs receive 69 cents for every 
dollar going to all other colleges and universities annually, per student, from all federal 




Since their founding in the 19th century, public HBCUs have not received state 
financial support commensurate with their primarily white institution (PWI) peers. Many 
researchers have assessed the historic disparities in state appropriations to HBCUs 
(Boland & Gasman, 2014; Gasman, 2010; Minor, 2008; Perna et al., 2006; Sav, 2010). 
Funding disparities had been fought periodically throughout the late 19th and 20th 
centuries via landmark legal cases, including Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), Brown v. Board 
of Education (1954), and more recently with Knight v. State of Alabama (2006). 
Recent studies demonstrated a continued disparity in state funding for public 
HBCUs. Sav (2010) found a 12.5 percent gap in state appropriations between public 
PWIs and public HBCUs. Both Minor (2008) and Boland and Gasman (2014) analyzed 
state funding in four of the states included in this study (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and North Carolina). Each state was shown to fund some or most of their public HBCUs 
at a lower per FTE rate than the state’s public PWIs of comparable size. Brady, Eatman, 
and Parker (2000), employed a critical race theory lens to illuminate inequities in higher 
education finance that continue to prevail between HBCUs and PWIs.  
It is important to acknowledge the ongoing funding disparity between public 
HBCUs and public PWIs when assessing the implementation and impact of performance-
based funding on public HBCUs. These institutions are already chronically underfunded. 
Most have small endowments and charge low tuition. They rely on state appropriations to 
continue to provide programming to their students (Gasman, 2010; Minor, 2008). Since 




depending on their success meeting specific metrics, institutions facing financial 
challenges such as HBCUs could be disproportionately penalized. 
Tuition Setting 
Two of the states in this study (Florida and Texas) allow institutions to determine 
tuition levels (though California public institutions enjoy varying degrees of autonomy, 
the four-year institutions determine tuition via compacts with the Governor. The 
legislature sets tuition in the community colleges). States vary in their approach to 
tuition-setting authority (McBain, 2010). Virginia also allows institutions to determine 
tuition. Washington State’s legislature rescinded tuition-setting authority for institutions 
following dramatic tuition increased following the 2008 recession. The rationale for 
institutional tuition-setting authority is that in the face of deep state disinvestment in 
public higher education, institutions must have the ability to backfill lost appropriation 
revenue (Flores & Shepherd, 2014; McBain, 2010). The research on tuition deregulation 
tends to focus on four-year institutions, as these have been responsible for substantial 
tuition increases that have created obstacles to access by exacerbating affordability issues 
(Doyle 2009; Heller, 2013; Long and Kurlaender 2009). Prior research on the effect of 
tuition deregulation on minority and low-income students resulted in mixed results 
(Eisenkopf 2004; Frenette 2005).  
A recent study by Flores and Shepherd (2014) reveals the detrimental impact of 
tuition deregulation on four-year public institutions on Hispanic students in Texas. 
Tuition spiked by 72% between fall 2003 and fall 2009 following tuition deregulation 




fell by 9.1%, despite an increase in the Hispanic high school graduation rate of 72% 
between 2002 and 2011. 
Financial Aid 
The finance policy shift in gradually transferring the burden of higher education 
costs from state government to students and families threaten stratification of U.S. higher 
education (Zumeta, et al., 2012). Financial aid has become essential to students and 
families, with some research demonstrating a link between financial aid and college 
completion (Baum, Ma, & Payea, 2013; Castleman & Long, 2016; Perna, 2010). 
Decreased financial assistance correlates to postsecondary attrition (Palmer, Davis, & 
Hilton, 2009). Effects of financial aid on enrollment and choice depend on aspects of the 
higher education context, including tuition, costs of attendance, and other types of 
financial aid (Heller, 2013; Perna & Kurban, 2013).  
Pell Grants 
The Pell Grant has enabled countless students to unlock the door to higher 
education. Its importance is emphasized by the fact that the previous two presidential 
administrations increased Pell Grant funding to $19 billion in 2014. Despite recent 
increases in Pell funding, many researchers note the fading purchasing power of the Pell 
Grant (Doyle, 2013; St. John, 2003). The increasing costs of attending college coupled 
with cratering state investment in higher education saps the purchasing power of the Pell 
Grant. Doyle (2013) asks whether the price of enrollment affects participation in higher 




tuition rates. Doyle argues that few measures have been more successful at increasing 
access and completion than decreasing the price of attendance. 
The purpose of the Pell Grant was to reduce financial barriers to college 
enrollment. It has become the primary need-based form of financial aid. The majority of 
college students receive some form of financial aid, with the Pell Grant comprising the 
largest portion of most student’s financial aid packages. Many researchers argue that 
financial aid of all forms- federal, state, and institutional- should target students who 
cannot afford to participate in postsecondary education otherwise (Delaney, 2014; Doyle, 
2013; Dynarski, 2000; Heller, 2003). Proponents of need-based financial aid contend that 
from an economist perspective, focusing on need-based aid is the most efficient use of 
scarce and dwindling state resources (Doyle, 2013). Such aid allows students without the 
financial means to enroll, unlike other middle and upper class students who would still 
enroll without financial aid. While support for the Pell Grant is widespread and somewhat 
non-partisan amongst state and federal lawmakers, empirical evidence of its contribution 
to access remains limited (Doyle, 2013; Hearn, 2001). This is due in large measure to the 
complexity in quantitatively evaluating the impact of the Pell on enrollment. Less 
research has demonstrated a causal relationship between Pell Grants and completion of a 
college credential.  
State Financial Aid 
A vast literature on state financial aid depicts the shift from need-based to non-
need based (merit). By the late 1990s and early 2000s, many states began leaning more 




Outstanding Pupils Educationally) is often viewed as ground zero for merit aid. The 
Georgia HOPE Scholarship is part of a suite of grants and scholarships, all of which are 
entirely funded by the state’s lottery system. Criteria include graduating from high school 
with at least a 3.0 GPA and maintaining this GPA in college. Another requirement is that 
recipients enroll in advanced courses in high school. 15 states adopted similar merit-aid 
policies inspired by Georgia’s example, including Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West 
Virginia. The percentage of students receiving federal financial aid in MSIs located in 
these states increased from 52% in 2000 to 71% in 2014. Institution aid increased from 
25% to 33%. State financial aid increased by the lowest amount: 39% to 46%. The form 
of financial assistance that increased the most was student loans. 28% of students used 
loans in 2000, compared to 48% in 2014 (Boland, 2017). 
While states continue to invest more into need-based aid, merit aid increased 
faster throughout the states up until the 2008 recession (Doyle, 2013). Doyle (2013) 
calculated that need-based aid increased by 43% between 2000 and 2011. During this 
same timeframe, merit-based aid increased by 350%. Merit aid for undergraduate 
students grew from $2.9 billion in 2005–2006 to $3.9 billion in 2010–2011 (Delaney, 
2014). Delaney (2014) argues that the political popularity of non-need based aid ensures 
its prominence in public policy. 
Loans 
Student loan debt has far outpaced other popular modes of American debt 




tuition and fees can be explained in part by the availability of loans. Yet the weakening 
purchasing power of the Pell Grant and stagnant or slowly rising state and institutional 
financial aid means that students and families rely more heavily on loans to subsidize a 
college education. The Institute for Research on Higher Education (2016) argues that 
state policy strategy of prioritizing student loans as a viable finance mechanism places 
undue burden on low and middle-income students and families. Research demonstrates 
that a high proportion of low-income student loan borrowers fail to complete a credential 
(Doyle, 2013; Hillman, 2013). Much less research as revealed how varying levels of debt 
affect retention and completion. Low-income students also pay a much higher proportion 
of their family income to attend college. Combined with mostly stagnant family income 
over the past decade, low-income families (and middle-income) are unable to afford 
higher education, let alone other staple life expenses (Prescott & Longanecker, 2014; 
Toutkoushian & Paulsen, 2016). 
The evolution of student loans reveals a primary weakness of finance policy 
overall, especially in regards to goals of attainment. One, it developed in an ad-hoc 
manner devoid of any form of central planning and led to deleterious unintended 
consequences. Two, both developed largely in response to middle and upper class 
interests. Three, student loans and finance policy in general consistently evolved via 
oftentimes opportunistic political maneuvering (Delaney, 2014; Doyle, 2013; Hillman, 
2013; Prescott & Longanecker, 2014).  
The Higher Education Act of 1965 demonstrated the tension between providing 




Johnson compromised with politicians to win some need-based financial aid by offering a 
concession in the form of private loans (Stafford loans). Availability of loans rose in the 
1980s due to rising tuition and the growing private return of higher education by the end 
of the decade.  Given the lack of policymaker interest in addressing student loans in the 
1980s and early 1990s, concerned policymakers passed legislation on loans via budget 
acts. As loans continued to evolve – and state funding for higher education became more 
volatile (balance wheel by Doyle and Delany), more low-income students and families 
relied on them, contrary to their original political purpose of offsetting higher education 
expenses for middle and upper-income students and families.  
College Affordability 
In his critical assessments of state public policy approach to higher education 
finance, St. John (2003) refers to the “new inequality of opportunity.” He- and many 
researchers- have empirically explored the problem of affordability and its impact on 
access. This research finds that the exponential increase in merit-based aid and federal tax 
credits has come at the expense of need-based aid. The financial aid imbalance benefits 
the middle and upper class while depriving lower-income students. This critical research 
holds public policy culpable for the increasing inequity in higher education finance and 
look to policy to challenge the pervasive stratification within higher education.  
Financial aid plays an integral role in mitigating declining affordability. Lynch, 
Engle and Cruz as well as Hearn and St. John discuss the decreasing purchasing power of 
the Pell Grant, especially in the face of stagnating or declining family incomes and 




occurred alongside policies begun during the late 1970s that favored increasing loans, 
merit-based and tax credits as the primary forms of financial aid (St. John, 2003). These 
shifts have led to a disparity in who shoulders much of the burden for financing higher 
education. Lynch, Engle and Cruz (2011) explain that in 275 colleges (many of which are 
MSIs), lower-income students pay over 100% of their family income. 
St. John (2003) argues that the 1970s and 1980s policy about-face resulted in the 
growth in disparity. Callan (2011) calls policy the driver of financial aid expansion 
during the Great Society of the 1960s and through much of the 1970s. Yet the late 1970s 
and 1980s saw a shift towards a more conservative-minded policy focus on reining in 
taxpayer expenditures. St. John (2003) argues that equitable access was sacrificed on the 
altar of political gamesmanship, as policymakers jockeyed for key middle and upper class 
votes. He emphasizes the political nature of the policymaking process and how it is 
important to recognize this in working towards shaping policy decisions. 
Social Stratification 
 
 Viewing MSIs through the lens of political frameworks and public policy research 
is essential in tracking the many connections between policy and performance in MSIs. 
Yet understanding the nuances of how MSIs exist within the context of U.S. higher 
education, educate their students, and graduate them into the workforce also requires a 
sociological conceptual approach.  
The concept of social stratification allows a focus on how dominant, complex 
institutions contribute to our understanding of racial and class inequality in higher 




Grusky (2014), systems of stratification—such as colleges and universities—are made of 
up three core components: 1) institutional processes define and determine the desired 
good or outcome (e.g. transferring to a four-year degree program), 2) the rules that 
regulate how these goods are distributed across “various positions or occupations in the 
division of labor,” and 3) “the mobility mechanisms that link individuals to occupations 
and thereby generate unequal control over valued resources” (p. 3). Despite the prevalent 
myth of higher education as a system of meritocracy and equal opportunity (Karabel, 
2005), one need only look to the state of California and how its structure of higher 
education exemplifies the very ideals of social stratification. These assumptions lead me 
to consider and question if and how Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs) are more 
effective pathways for minority students in ways that offer them a meaningful advantage 
over their non-MSI peers, thereby representing an effort to reshape the current structure 
of higher education and to discourage the inequality that this structure is known to 
produce (Grodsky & Jackson, 2009).         
Continuing with the example of California, the growth of the state’s economy can 
be traced back to its investment in the Master Plan for Higher Education, which helped 
enroll and produce trained and qualified individuals to address the growing needs of the 
state’s economy. But as California became more racially and economically diverse, the 
Plan was seen less as a source of equal opportunity and outcomes and more of a social 
sieve that regulated “access to privileged positions” by race and social class (Stevens, 
Armstrong & Arum, 2008). The University of California System sits on top of this 




conferring on students degrees that are more prestigious and well-received by the 
workforce or graduate and professional educational programs (e.g. medical and law 
schools), and reproducing—maintaining—or improving their class status in life (Geiser 
& Atkinson, 2012). This left a greater majority of students from less affluent 
backgrounds with access to less reputable campuses of the California State University 
and the California Community College Systems and, correspondingly, with opportunities 
that reproduced their social status or discouraged their ability to be upwardly mobile. The 
process of sorting students through this system strengthened the relationship between 
race and social class and degree attainment and workforce success, thereby exacerbating 
social inequality witnessed in the broader society. This tiered state system of higher 
education became a source of social stratification, linking “differential rewards and 
accidents of birth” (Grodsky & Jackson, 2009). 
At the bottom of this stratified system are two-year institutions, which are 
characterized by significant challenges related to institutional and state bureaucracy, the 
task of educating nearly half of all students in postsecondary education, supporting a 
more diverse population of students who come from a wider degree of academic 
preparedness and enter with aspirations and goals that may deviate from the four-way 
path, and operating with fewer resources or less access to mechanisms for sustained 
funding. These challenges cultivate a campus environment that has overwhelmed 
students, discourage their academic performance and, ultimately, delay their time to 
completion (Bailey, Jaggars, & Jenkins, 2015; Rosenbaum & Deil-Amen, & Person, 




working class backgrounds, student populations that dominate two-year institutions. With 
the rise of two-year MSIs in California, the question of their influence on minority 
achievement warrants attention from both scholarly and policy debates on the merit and 
effectiveness of higher education in this country.  
Through the Higher Education Act of 1965, MSIs represented both a social and 
political response to the demand and need for equitable opportunity in higher education 
for historically marginalized populations (Gasman, Nguyen & Conrad, 2014). Under the 
Act, MSIs receive two significant benefits from the federal government to help them 
achieve this aim: 1) Legal recognition as a sector of American postsecondary education 
to be monitored and supported by the U.S. Department of Education, 2) Funds from the 
U.S. Department of Education to develop and promote promising practices and services 
intended to support institutions’ target populations (e.g. HSIs and Latino/a students), as 
well as funds earmarked for MSIs from other federal agencies, such as the National 
Science Foundation. 
In essence, MSIs represent a significant policy that demonstrates the recognition 
of inequality that continues to perniciously influence communities of color and a 
deepening, and long-term investment that is required to hinder its effects. At no point, 
however, has this federal policy ever been in conversation with state policies, such as 
those framed by the California Master Plan. This paper is an attempt to embed MSIs 
within the state context to establish a foundational understanding of how MSIs are 




Other research on the stratification in higher education provides examples of the 
outcomes of policy on increasing stratification. Davies & Zarifa (2012) explore how 
expansion and inequality happens at the individual and structural levels. Upper-class 
groups move through advanced levels of education and elite institutions through a 
process terms “maximally maintained inequality” (Raftery & Hout, 1993). This occurs as 
lower status groups have accessed higher education tiers. Such a cycle engenders further 
degree accumulation as both status signposts and a ticket to enter higher-paying 
occupations (Lucas, 2001). Many researchers have explored this process through the 
lenses of race, gender, and socioeconomic status in relation to education sector and field 
of study, as well as occupation and earnings (Davies & Guppy, 1997; Espenshade & 
Radford, 2009; Gerber & Cheung, 2008; Grodsky, 2007; Hearn, 1991; Karen, 2002; 
Mullen & Goyette, 2010; Mullen, Goyette, & Soares, 2003). 
Stratification can occur at the institutional level when colleges and universities 
compete for scarce resources. By its nature, U.S. higher education is vastly unequal 
system. Community colleges- the sector educating the majority of college students- is its 
least resourced arm. Some researchers argue that policymakers strategically advance 
stratification by subjecting institutions to less state support and/or making a portion of 
appropriations contingent on institutions meeting performance metrics (Davies & Zarifa, 
2012; Dougherty & Natow, 2015). The ultimate goal of such a strategy is weaning public 
higher education off of state support (Brint & Karabel, 1989; Davies & Zarifa, 2012; 




competition fosters greater disparities that would inhibit social mobility (Davies & Zarifa, 
2012; Trow, 1984).  
Studying stratification in higher education from a sociological vantage is helpful 
in illuminating stagnant completion rates amongst students of color. While Black and 
Hispanic students gained access in greater numbers since the 1970s, they still fail to 
complete in percentages similar to White and some Asian students (Posselt, Jacquette, 
Bielby, & Bastedo, 2012). Many researchers have explored the racial and class 
foundation to much of the inequity in completion throughout the tiers of U.S. higher 
education (Astin, 1985; Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009; Carnevale & Rose, 2003; 
Long & Kurlaender, 2009). Posselt, Jacquette, Bielby, & Bastedo (2012) found that 
selective institutions heightened admissions requirements, which in turn limited the 
enrollment of students of color. 
Guiding Theoretical Perspectives 	
 
 Research into college access and choice is often structured on the theoretical 
bulwark of economic and sociocultural approaches. According to human capital theory, 
students and their families assess the costs and benefits of enrolling in postsecondary 
education. They make informed decisions about what stands to be gained and at what 
price (in terms of fees, materials, and foregone earnings). At the core of this economic 
concept is the belief that an individual’s investment in education increases her or his 
productivity and future earnings. Since students experience varying levels of academic 
preparation and academic performance, rational economic theory assumes disparities in 




The human capital investment model cannot entirely explain gaps in college 
choice and access across sex, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (SES) (Perna, 
2006). Research reveals widely varying availability and interpretation of information 
regarding financing higher education and obtaining financial aid. Due to these 
differences, individuals’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of higher education vary 
depending on access to information and non-economic factors including family, 
community, and high school contexts (Paulsen, 2001).     
Sociocultural theoretical conceptions of college choice and enrollment illuminate 
the socioeconomic context wherein individual decision-making occurs. A sociocultural 
approach is predicated on status attainment models that frame a student’s interest in 
pursuing higher education according to the student’s social context, which includes 
family, teachers, guidance counselors, and friends (McDonough, 1997). This context 
directly contributes to an individual’s decision to attend college, as well as her or his 
potential to complete a postsecondary education. 
Intrinsic to sociocultural approaches to college access are notions of social and 
cultural capital. Sociological research tends to give primacy to Bourdieu’s (1986) 
conception of social capital, which prioritizes the social value of an individual’s 
affiliation with a particular social group. According to Bourdieu (1986), this social value 
affords access to networks offering varying levels of social currency (e.g., information). 
Bourdieu’s view aligns with education-focused social capital theory in situating social 
networks within specific social relations and structures. The nature of social capital varies 




(Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001). Bourdieu (1986) and McDonough (1997) emphasize the 
importance of habitus to a sociocultural approach. Recognizing a student’s social context 
is essential in understanding her or his college-going decisions. Habitus refers to an 
individual’s internalization of all notions derived from the environment and how these 






















CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To date, there has been limited causal evidence demonstrating a link between 
Title III and V federal grants and college outcomes. This study incorporates a quasi-
experimental research approach to estimate the relationship between federal MSI grants 
and institutional student outcome measures. The mechanism and criteria by which the 
federal government awards an MSI grant allows the opportunity to employ econometric 
methods to account for the possible self-selection bias that could weaken research on the 
effect of financial policy intervention (Becker, 2004; Dynarski, 2002; Heller, 2004). By 
treating the requirements of applying for an MSI grant as an experiment, I use a 
regression discontinuity design to make causal inference estimates of the impact of an 
MSI grant on institutional outcomes including college completion and upward social 
mobility (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Schneider, Carnoy, Kilpatrick, Schmidt, & 
Shalveson, 2007). The primary research questions of this study are:  
1. Is there a relationship between Title V and Title III funding for MSIs and 
college completion? 
2. Is there a relationship between Title V and Title III funding for MSIs and 
upward social mobility?  
Analytic Sample and Data 
 
For this empirical analysis, I constructed a unique institution-level panel dataset 
spanning 2000 - 2015 with 63,542 observations and consisting primarily of data culled 
from the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center of Education Statistics IPEDS 




Education’ Office of Postsecondary Education’s Title V and Title III data relating to MSI 
grant funding, and the Penn Center for Minority Serving Institutions. Additional variables 
were collected from the National Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs 
(NASSGAP), the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
I focus on Alaska Native and Hawaiian Native Serving Institutions (ANNH), 
Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander Serving Institutions 
(AANAPISIs), Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs), Native American Serving Non-
Tribal Institutions (NASNTIs), and Primarily Black Institutions (PBIs). I exclude 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and Tribal Colleges and 
Universities (TCUs), as these were founded specifically as MSIs and do not become 
eligible to receive Title III or Title V grant funding based on enrollment thresholds. I also 
exclude two-year not-for-profit private and less than two-year non-profit institutions, as 
there are very few MSIs within this sector (n = 13).  
IPEDS 
The U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) hosts Integrated Postsecondary Education Statistics (IPEDS), a comprehensive 
publicly available data source including more than 7,500 colleges and universities that 
participate in federal financial aid program. IPEDS is amongst the few datasets that 
provides enrollment, completion, and finance data. It is a system built on interrelated 
surveys conducted annually by NCES. IPEDS collects information from every college, 
university, and technical and vocational institution that participates in federal student 




institutions participating in federal student aid programs report data on enrollments, 
program completions, graduation rates, faculty and staff, finances, institutional prices, 
and student financial aid (NCES, n.d.). 
Equality of Opportunity Project Mobility Report Cards 
 The Equality of Opportunity Project provides extensive publicly available data on 
intergenerational income mobility used in affiliated researchers’ reports. Data for this 
study relates to Chetty et al. (2017), which uses several datasets including information for 
every U.S. postsecondary institution and more than 30 million college students between 
the years 1999-2013. The sample included in Chetty et al. (2017) comprises U.S. citizens 
with a Social Security Number or Individual Taxpayer Identification Number who were 
born between 1980-1991, and could be associated with their parents. 
U.S. Department of Education Office of Postsecondary Education 
The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329), authorizes 
the operation of numerous federal aid programs that provide support both to individuals 
pursuing a postsecondary education and to institutions of higher education. It also 
authorizes certain activities and functions. The most recent comprehensive 
reauthorization of the HEA was in 2008 under the Higher Education Opportunity Act 
(HEOA; P.L. 110-315). The U.S. Department of Education maintains data on MSI 
federal grant applications and awards dating back to FY 2009. It is currently the most 
comprehensive repository of MSI grant information per institution available. Additional 
restricted-use data on project abstracts and per institution award amounts came from an 




Penn Center for Minority Serving Institutions Database 
This institution-level restricted use database consists of all institutions designated 
as MSIs (as of fall 2016). It is based on IPEDS data and divides institutions according to 
federal designation and grant award type. As it defines an institution according to receipt 
of a federal MSI grant, this dataset more strictly characterizes an institution as an MSI 
compared to other MSI advocacy organizations. Thus, the number of institutions 
categorized as MSIs in this study is likely lower than the number found in reports 
published by other organizations producing work focused on the different MSI types.    
Dependent Variables 
 
There are multiple dependent variables included within this study to obtain as 
accurate an analysis as possible of the impact of Title V and Title III funding on 
institutional college completion and upward mobility outcomes. Dependent variables are 
divided into two analyses: college completion and upward social mobility. The primary 
college completion dependent variables in this study are associate’s degrees, two-year 
certificate and bachelor’s degrees for the Title V and Title III MSIs. These dependent 
variables are disaggregated by race and ethnicity and gathered from IPEDS (retention, 
associate’s and bachelor’s degrees, and two-year certificates). Since IPEDS does not 
presently disaggregate institutions by MSI categories beyond HBCUs and TCUs, 
institutions were categorized according to the Penn Center for Minority Serving 
Institutions’ MSI database. Each category of MSI is a dichotomous variable and all MSIs 
are also included as a dichotomous variable (1=MSI, 0=non-MSI). While IPEDS offers 




through its available completion datasets disaggregated by race and ethnicity per each 
outcome variable. I created these variables, which include all races and ethnicities per 
outcome variable: all completion measures in the aggregate, bachelor’s degrees in both 
public and private four-year institutions, associate’s degrees, and two-year certificates. 
All completion dependent variables are continuous.   
The dependent variables in the social mobility component of analysis are derived 
from the Equality of Opportunity Project. These variables are based on the five income 
quintiles included in research conducted by the Equality of Opportunity Project Social 
Mobility Report Cards. These include rising from the lowest income quintile to at least 
two quintiles higher, the lowest income quintile to the top 20 percent, and then varying 
levels of progression in between those levels (Chetty et al., 2017; Hillman, 2017). Chetty 
et al. (2017) explain that approximately 9 in 100 students achieve at least two levels of 
quintile progression and 1 in 100 students move from the lowest quintile to the highest. 
Chetty et al. (2017) determine the mobility rate through multiplying the percentage of 
students in the lowest income quintile (access rate) by the percentage of those who rise to 
the highest income quintile as adults (success rate). There are in total six variables for 
upward mobility (Hillman, 2017): 
1. Bottom and to the highest (fifth quintile) 
2. Bottom to the second to highest (fourth quintile) 
3. Bottom to the third from the highest (third quintile) 
4. One quintile from the bottom (second) to the highest  (fifth) 




6. Three quintiles from bottom to the highest (fifth) 
7. Rising by any two quintiles 
Independent Variables 
 
Several factors have been shown to significantly affect student completion at the 
institution level. These include student characteristics (race/ethnicity, socioeconomic 
status as represented by the number of Pell recipients, and the proportion of enrollment 
that is students of color), institution characteristics (total enrollment, proportion of 
enrollment that is part-time, finance and revenue, tuition and fees, and instructional 
expenses), financial aid (Pell Grants, state need-based aid, and state merit-based aid), and 
state demographic and economic factors (percent of the population age 25 and older 
without a bachelor’s degree, state unemployment level, and state per capita income) 
(Dynarski, 1999; Titus, 2009).  
Student Characteristics 
Based on the IPEDS variable of enrollment as per race/ethnicity, this includes 
American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic, Non-resident Alien, Two or More Races, White non-Hispanic, and Unknown. 
Prior research on higher education has used Pell Grant receipt as an imperfect proxy for 
SES. This study will follow suit and also incorporate other financial aid variables found 
in IPEDS (institution, state, and other federal financial aid, student loans). These will be 







Researchers have shown a relationship between institutional finance factors and 
college completion measures (Webber & Ehrenberg, 2009). These have been 
incorporated in this study and include state, local and federal appropriations, tuition and 
fees (as a source of revenue), total operating revenue, instructional expenses, academic 
support, federal operating grants and contracts, state operating grants and contracts, local 
operating grants and contracts. Also included are indicator variables for institutional 
selectivity. All institutional finance variables from IPEDS for analysis in this study were 
adjusted according to Jaquette & Parra’s (2014) suggestions for correcting potential 
misuses of IPEDS data given parent-child relationships and mismatches between 
academic and fiscal years, depending on particular IPEDS surveys.  
State Demographic and Economic Factors 
As described in the review of the literature, state contextual factors have been 
shown to substantially affect institutions and outcomes. These demographic variables 
include the state’s unemployment rate, the percent of the population above the age of 25 
hold a baccalaureate degree, and the state per capita income. Titus (2009) has explored 
how these factors have had a demonstrable impact on bachelor’s degree attainment. 
Similarly, studies exploring the effect of performance funding on baccalaureate degree 
production have noted some statistically significant effects on state-specific demographic 
variables (Dougherty and Reddy, 2013; Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016; Rutherford & 




 All continuous variables have been transformed to their natural logs in accordance 
with regression assumptions and to better interpret results. Wooldridge (2013) suggests 




Attempting to estimate the causal effect of the MSI grant on outcomes is 
complicated by many factors. A linear OLS regression model fails to control for several 
sets of potentially intervening variables. One possibility is that the desire of an institution 
to apply for federal funding could result in some form of manipulating enrollment to 
result in the institution achieving the student racial and income threshold to be eligible for 
the Title III or Title V grants. Also, many institutions eligible to apply for an MSI grant 
are unaware of such eligibility (most often with eligible AANAPISIs). In these instances, 
the treatment would not be strictly exogenous and would thus violate regression 
assumptions and lead to biases results. Other unobserved factors could also be 
endogenous and create biased coefficients (Becker, 2004; Cellini, 2008; Dynarski, 2003; 
Heller, 2004).   
By using a regression discontinuity research design, a researcher can make causal 
estimates of the impact of policy interventions by accounting for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that could be correlated with the MSI grant (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; 
Cellini, 2008; Schneider et al., 2007; Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960). This approach 
divides subjects into treatment and control groups depending on a factor that is 




treatment, this could bias the results of the study. Regression discontinuity mimics an 
experiment at the cutoff value of a particular variable (the forcing or running variable) 
(Lee & Card, 2008). This quasi-experimental approach allows the researcher to obtain a 
causal estimate of a programmatic effect (as measured by outcome variables) without the 
random assignment of the treatment to a particular group as found in randomized control 
trials (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Higher education researchers routinely employ 
regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effects of various higher education 
interventions, including the measurement of college completion (Bettinger, 2004; van der 
Klaauw, 2002). 
A robust regression discontinuity study requires the careful selection of a forcing 
variable (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). The regression discontinuity design exploits a 
discontinuity in the probability of treatment due to a small change in the forcing variable 
for institutions just above and below the treatment cutoff point. MSIs receive federal 
funding (treatment), compared to institutions that do not (comparison). Treatment is 
assigned based on a forcing variable (enrollment represented as a continuous variable) 
with a specific cutoff (a percentage a particular racial or ethnic enrollment category). As 
an institution is primarily designated as an MSI according to the enrollment of a specific 
racial group, my forcing variable will be enrollment based on race and ethnicity.  
Estimation Procedures 
 
Most studies using regression discontinuity rely on multiple specifications to 
fortify the robustness of the findings. The two estimation approaches in regression 




most common non-parametric regression discontinuity method is a local linear 
regression. This approach narrowly focuses on subjects near the cutoff. It utilizes Wald 
estimators or local-polynomial regression). 
Parametric approaches tend to take the form of sharp or fuzzy regression 
discontinuity designs. In an application of sharp regression discontinuity in this study, the 
impact of the MSI grant would be estimated by regressing the MSI grant award on the 
assignment variable (enrollment by specific racial category) and on an indicator 
depending on the discontinuity in the MSI grant rule (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; van der 
Klaauw, 2002). The indicator variable coefficients could be interpreted as a causal 
estimate of the impact of the MSI grant. The theoretical justification for a sharp design 
would be every institution automatically receiving an MSI grant upon reaching a specific 
enrollment threshold of students of color and low-income students. 
The statistical representation of sharp regression discontinuity is: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽MSIGrant𝑖+ 𝛾′+  𝑓(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖) + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀 
𝑌𝑖 represents the outcome variable. MSIGrant𝑖 is an indicator for whether the 
subject received treatment. 𝑓𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 is a flexible form of the forcing variable, which 
could be linear, quadratic, cubic, etc. The relationship between 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 and 𝑌𝑖 can be 
different before and after cutoff. 𝑋𝑖 is a set of control variables. 𝜀 is a random error term. 
𝛽 can be interpreted as the causal effect of treatment on the outcome for subjects who are 
near the cutoff value. 
In an instance when the assignment rule is correlated with the treatment without 




deployed (Lesik, 2006; van der Klaauw, 2002). The MSI federal grant can be considered 
a natural application of fuzzy regression discontinuity, since the determination of which 
institutions receives the grant depends on an assignment rule intrinsic to an institution’s 
enrollment. Yet becoming eligible for the grant is not completely explained by the rule. 
Additionally, not every institution eligible for the MSI grant applies for it. This is another 
common reason to rely on fuzzy regression discontinuity. When implementing a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design, a two-stage process estimates the causal impact of a 
treatment that is similar to instrumental variables strategy (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; van 
der Klaauw, 2002). The initial stage involves the predicted treatment level being 
estimated via regression of the actual treatment on the assignment rule variable and on 
indicator variables depending on the decision rule to account for the discontinuity. In the 
second stage, the causal impact of the treatment is identified as the “coefficient on the 
predicted treatment variable derived in the first stage is regressed upon the outcome 
variable controlling for the assignment rule. 
The first stage is represented as: 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Eligible𝑖 + 𝛾′+   𝑓(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖) + 𝜃′𝑋𝑖+ 𝜀 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is an indicator for whether the subject received treatment. Eligible𝑖 is 
an indicator of whether they were deemed eligible for treatment based upon forcing 
variable. This is a variable that indicates if they should have received treatment. 
The second stage can be represented as: 




MSIgrant𝑖 is the predicted likelihood of treatment estimates from the first stage. 𝛽 
is the impact of treatment on the treated. This is the effect of the treatment for those who 
received the treatment. 
To identify the treatment effect of an institution being entitled to the MSI federal 
grant, I take advantage of the fact that grant eligibility depends on an enrollment 
threshold. As enrollments across institutions are theoretically exogenous and assuming 
that institutions are not manipulating enrollment, I focus on MSIs within the vicinity of 
the eligibility threshold. I assume that the institutions just below the enrollment threshold 
(emerging MSIs) demonstrate many similarities to those MSIs just above the threshold. 
Receipt of the MSI federal grant can be considered as a random assignment. Given the 
assumption that without the treatment, the outcome is a function of the MSI grant, the 
causal effect of receiving the grant is identified through a comparison between the 
average outcomes of institutions just above (MSIs) with those just below (emerging 
MSIs) in a fuzzy regression discontinuity research approach.   
The primary benefit of employing non-parametric methods is that they offer 
estimates based on the data near the cut-off. Local linear regressions are optimal because 
they have better bias properties and have better convergence. In other words, this can 
reduce bias that results from using data farther from the cutoff to estimate the 
discontinuity at the cutoff. Using both estimation approaches strengthens the results of 
the study as it can be argued that the results do not rely on the particular approach used 




In parametric approaches, the relationship between the forcing variable and the 
dependent variable is modeled with a functional form, such as linear, cubic, or quadratic. 
An advantage of this approach is that it uses all data, thus increasing the power of the 
analysis. Yet it relies on assumptions regarding the functional forms. The primary 
assumption in the parametric regression discontinuity strategy is that the functional form 
between the forcing variable and the outcome is identified and the average outcome for 
those just below the cutoff serves as a counterfactual for those just above the cutoff (Lee 
and Lemieux, 2010). It should be emphasized that this assumption does not suggest that 
every institution from the sample above and below the cutoff point share similarities on 
all unobserved factors, but only that these subjects become similar on these factors in the 
limit as the forcing variable nears the cutoff threshold (Murname & Willett, 2011). 
Analysis 
 
To answer its research questions, this study includes three primary analyses using 
parametric fuzzy regression discontinuity design: 
1. Title V and college completion 
2. Title V and upward mobility 
3. Title III and college completion 
For an institution to be eligible to receive Title V funding as an HSI, it must be 
comprised of a full-time enrollment that is at minimum 25 percent Latino/a. Thus, the 
forcing variable in relation to Title V for college completion outcomes as well as upward 
mobility is the proportion of Latino/a enrollment. Title V was passed into law in 1998. 




timeframe for Title V analyses is 2000 to 2006 based on the average number of years for 
students to obtain a bachelor’s degree.  
Chetty et al. (2017) describe their definition of upward mobility as the 
comparison between parent’s income and children’s income at ages 32-34. The Equality 
of Opportunity Project data is oriented according to cohorts based on student birth years. 
They calculate data values as an average of the 1980, 1981, and 1982 birth cohorts. This 
corresponds to 2010, 2011, and 2012 in this study’s dataset, allowing approximately ten 
years after those in these birth cohorts completed their college credentials. Mobility 
outcome measures in this study are derived from the mean values of these years matched 
to the Equality of Opportunity Project birth cohort years. Thus, I focus on an average of 
the 2000, 2001, and 2002 years to evaluate upward mobility in HSIs according to the 
implementation of Title V. 
Mobility outcome measures are based on those calculated by Hillman (2017). 
Each variable is a product of the fraction of parents in an income quintile and the 
probability of their children within a quintile contingent on their parent’s income quintile: 
1. Bottom and to the highest (1st to 5th) 
2. Bottom to the second to highest (1st to 4th) 
3. Bottom to the third from the highest (1st to 3rd) 
4. One quintile from the bottom to the highest  (2nd to 5th) 
5. One quintile from the bottom to the second from highest (2nd to 4th) 
6. Three quintiles from bottom to the highest (3rd to 5th) 




Several categories of MSIs receive funding via Title III. As the focus of this study 
is on the impact of Title III for all MSIs that receive funding via Title III on college 
outcomes, this analysis requires a multiple-cutoff regression discontinuity design based 
on the incorporation of multiple enrollment thresholds. This form of regression 
discontinuity incorporates more than one forcing variable. As Title III provides funding 
for several categories of MSIs, using a multiple-cutoff regression discontinuity approach 
is preferred. This allows for an analysis of AANAPISIs (10 percent enrollment of Asian 
American and Pacific Islander students), ANNHs (20 percent Alaska Native and 
Hawaiian Native students), NASNTIs (20 percent American Indian students), and PBIs 
(40 percent Black students). Researchers have accounted for the heterogeneity in the 
value of multiple cutoffs through normalizing the score so that the cutoff becomes zero 
for all units. Through this “normalizing-and-pooling approach,” inferences can then be 
made as in the case of a standard regression discontinuity design (Cattaneo, Keele, 
Titiunik, & Vazquez-Bare, 2016).  
Institutions began receiving funding via Title III as MSIs in the 2008-2009 
academic year. The timeframe for the analysis of college completion measures for Title 
III is 2009 – 2015. Data from the Equality of Opportunity Project Mobility Report Cards 
do not cover years after 2013. They also measure mobility ten years after a student 
completes their college credential. Thus, this study cannot conduct a proper investigation 
of the impact of Title III MSI grants on upward mobility given limitations in available 
data and the minimal number of treatment and post-treatment years since the advent of 






There are several techniques utilized by researchers to test the validity of 
regression discontinuity designs. A common approach is to test the robustness of 
estimates across different functional forms of the assignment variables in the first and 
second stages of a two-stage least squares procedure. This usually takes the form of 
including an alternative polynomial function, such as linear, cubic, quartic, or quadratic. 
A researcher will often report the results of one form (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). The results 
of these tests are presented in the appendix.    
Other methods can be implemented to test the validity of the research design. 
McCrary (2008) introduced the density test, which relates to an examination of the 
density of observations of the assignment variable. The appearance of a discontinuity in 
the density of the assignment variable near the cutoff point for treatment indicates that 
some subjects manipulated their treatment status. In the case of this study, this would be 
represented by institutions gaming their enrollment totals to gain eligibility to apply for 
the MSI federal grant. I performed the McCrary test and found no evidence of institutions 
manipulating their enrollment to be eligible for federal MSI funding.  
Another validity test similar to closely assessing the means of variables in both 
groups near the cutoff, the continuity of observable control variables should not change 
significantly in the treatment group. In other words, we expect that since the variables 
were determined before treatment (receiving the MSI federal grant), these variables 
(excluding the dependent variables) should not change after the introduction of the 




A final validity check common to other quasi-experimental research strategies is 
adding or removing covariates to determine the impact on results. If parameter estimates 
prove sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of control variables, this calls the design’s 
validity into question. If a substantial volume of bias is present that is explained by 
covariates, this then significantly affects the parameter estimates. These models are 
included in the appendix and did not demonstrate a detectable impact throughout the 
different dependent variable estimations. 
Limitations 
 
Despite precautions taken to control for potential bias in the awarding of the 
federal MSI grant, it is more accurate to claim that findings from the study are plausibly 
causal in nature regarding the relationship between the grant and outcomes. Results from 
the regression discontinuity design could be affected by unobserved factors not controlled 
for in the study. Efforts have been taken to minimize the impact of such unobserved 
characteristics as described in the validity section above. It is possible that another federal 
financial, state, or institution financial intervention could have an effect on student 
outcomes. Another concern is the potential for manipulation bias. Robustness checks in 
the research design should guard against manipulation bias, but there remains the 
possibility it would not account for any possibility of an institution adjusting enrollment 
numbers (through different means) in order to be eligible for an MSI grant. 
Another limitation of the study is its generalizability to non-MSIs and MSIs not 
included in the study in other categories or other states. The MSI federal grant is unique 




institutions are eligible based on the enrollment of a specific student population. Thus, 
HBCUs and TCUs are not included in this study due to the fact that these institutions 
were established specifically to serve students of color and not due to a change in the 
enrollment of such students.  
Lastly, this study relies entirely on its data sources for the reliability of the 
measurement and reporting of that data. Measurement error is possible in some instances, 
though unlikely on a large scale given the general dependability of the data sources used 
in this study. As noted above, the IPEDS survey relating to enrollment figures is one area 
that could bias the results of the study if an institution manipulated the reporting of such 
data as part of a strategy to gain eligibility for an MSI grant. There are more limitations 
associated with the Equality of Opportunity Project data that limit the scope of this study. 
First, data used in this study are not currently disaggregated by race and ethnicity, as this 
dataset focuses on institutional outcomes as measured by upward mobility. While 
outcome variables for the completion analysis do feature this information separately, the 
upward mobility analysis does not include this more granular empirical approach. 
Second, as noted above, parent-child relationships in IPEDS data are a concern for all 
researchers using IPEDS data in empirical analysis. Nearly 600 institutions are included 
with other institutions, such as larger state systems. It is possible that in such cases, a 
specific school could have more of an impact on results. Also, more than half of the 
institutions in this dataset are missing varying amount of information. Approximately 70 
percent of institutions in the Equality of Opportunity Project data could be matched to the 




students transferring to one or more institutions throughout their undergraduate careers. 
This is an important consideration, as roughly 40 percent of freshmen students transfer to 
another institution within six years of enrolling in the first institution (Shapiro, Dundar, 
Huie, Wakhungu, Yuan, Nathan, & Hwang, 2017). While the exact process on how the 
researchers chose the primary institution for transfer students is opaque, the dataset 
includes transfer students based on the institution they enrolled in for the longest amount 






















Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables included in 
the Title V phase of analysis. There are a total of 734 public four-year institutions, 1,717 
private four-year institutions, and 1,027 community colleges in the sample. Each category 
of MSI per sector is show in table 4. Private four-year schools comprised the largest 
number of institutions (1,648) and public four-year the least (667). As seen in table 5, the 
public four-year institutions awarded on average nearly 1,400 bachelor’s degrees between 
2000 and 2006. Private four-year colleges and universities awarded near 300 bachelor’s 
degrees during the same timeframe. Community colleges awarded approximately 100 
associate’s degrees and certificates on average between 2000 and 2006. Table 5 also 
includes the average for all college credentials disaggregated by race and ethnicity.     
Table 4: 











AANAPISI 30 23 69 122
AANH 5 0 5 10
HSI 52 68 135 255
NASNTI 6 1 9 16
PBI 8 18 69 95





Average of dependent variables included in Title V analysis, 2000-2006  
 
Table 6 includes descriptive statistics for the independent variables in the Title V 
analysis for public four-year institutions, Table 7 includes independent variable statistics 
for private four-year institutions, and those statistics for community colleges are 
presented in Table 8. Each category- institutional finance, enrollment, financial aid, 
institutional characteristics, and state characteristics- corresponds to each postsecondary 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Total BA, public four year 1399.536 1593.978 0 9840 4,508
Total BA, private four year 287.0092 470.1849 0 7497 11,448
Latino/a BA, public four year 104.0047 252.9412 0 3092 4,508
Latino/a BA, private four year 19.5642 66.3286 0 1322 11,448
Asian American & Pacific Islander BA, 
public four year 94.07614 273.1066 0 3110 4,508
Asian American & Pacific Islander BA, 
private four year 14.57737 54.52462 0 1110 11,448
White BA, public four year 984.8841 1188.552 0 8386 4,508
White BA, private four year 200.0156 331.619 0 6797 11,448
Black BA, public four year 115.341 169.1967 0 1523 4,508
Black BA, private four year 24.23334 62.92764 0 1202 11,448
American Indian & Alaska Native BA, 
public four year 10.94859 25.7543 0 367 4,508
American Indian & Alaska Native BA, 
private four year 1.325964 3.7193 0 201 11,448
Non-resident alien BA, public four year 38.346 67.0276 0 523 4,508
Non-resident alien BA, private four year 11.2266 31.03905 0 414 11,448
Total AS 97.49073 292.7666 0 16676 9,350
Latino/a AS 10.1835 60.2068 0 4073 9,350
White AS 64.60193 201.6112 0 11944 9,350
Asian American & Pacific Islander AS 4.622659 24.925 0 644 9,350
American Indian & Alaska Native AS 1.443 9.0336 0 578 9,350
Black AS 10.81251 47.8799 0 2891 9,350
Non-resident alien AS 1.909 12.7526 0 742 9,350
Total Certificates 95.04131 256.514 0 13773 9,350
Latino/a Certificates 16.3844 96.1406 0 6399 9,350
White Certificates 50.5764 148.7455 0 6867 9,350
Asian American & Pacific Islander 
Certificates 4.2815 24.6095 0 1939 9,350
American Indian & Alaska Native 
Certificates 1.0648 6.8945 0 394 9,350
Black Certificates 15.9908 53.2757 0 1606 9,350




sector. As described earlier, variable selection was informed by this study’s conceptual 
approach. Theoretically, these characteristics are believed to directly have an impact on 
degree or credential completion as well as upward social mobility.    
Table 6: 











Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Academic Support* 11862.28 23892.5 0 273961.8 3,808
Instruction* 62596.2 87157.8 0 869486 3,822
Federal Operating Grants* 31858.95 69566.51 0 69566.51 3,822
Federal Grants Other* 1115.805 3403.586 0 84697.3 3,822
Total Operating Revenues* 190614.7 341412 0 3671590 3,822
Local Appropriations* 361.6698 3060.543 0 61266.49 3,822
State Appropriations* 64594.54 64594.54 0 642514 3,822
Federal Appropriations* 3081.503 29683.97 0 525575.9 3,822
State Operating Grants* 6668.906 12225.03 0 134953 3,822
Tuition & Fees* 42152.65 58948.95 0 58948.95 3,822
Pell Grants* 5615.662 5574.218 0 90388.86 3,822
State Need-Based Aid* 170253.9 227798.8 0 886020.1 5130
State Merit-Based Aid* 36809.21 83557.63 0 479420 5130
Total full-time, first time enrollment 8257.799 7595.425 0 7595.425 3,822
In-state Tuition and Fees 3852.262 1946.665 0 21487 3,822
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees 9644.424 4151.338 0 29064 3,822
State per Capita Income 32363.01 5621.351 20563 57025 5,130
State unemployment rate 5.1045 1.0273 2.3 8.1416 5,130
Percent of state age 25 or older with 





Table 7:  













Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
State Grants* 825.1343 1656.413 0 25017.52 12,354
Federal Grants Other* 581.5148 1827.919 -680.891 35413.8 12,354
Federal Operating Grants* 926.4423 2923.111 0 84626.26 12,354
Academic Support* 410.3677 3361.5 0 299425 12,363
Instruction* 20162.66 67508.51 0 1152617 12,363
Total Operating Revenues* 74268.47 306764.2 0 7488944 12,354
Local Appropriations* 9.222 58.221 0 1684.254 12,354
State Appropriations* 196.663 1502.225 0 39118 12,354
Federal Appropriations* 192.6031 4926.11 0 181636.9 12,354
Tuition & Fees* 22908.1 49436.7 0 973761 12,354
Pell Grants* 1035.387 2283.753 0 70162.16 12,354
State Need-Based Aid* 221651.5 252310.4 0 886020.1 12,354
State Merit-Based Aid* 34789.68 76088.87 0 479420 12,354
Total full-time, first time enrollment 1720.183 2273.994 0 30798 12,354
In-state Tuition and Fees 11634.36 7839.178 0 34042 12,354
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees 11639.32 8050.806 0 34042 12,354
State per Capita Income 33222.35 5350.976 20563 57025 14,170
State unemployment rate 5.1045 1.0273 2.3 8.1416 14,170
Percent of state age 25 or older with 










Average statistics for the dependent variables in the Title III analysis are featured 
in Table 9. Between 2007 and 2015, public four-year institutions awarded over 1,600 
bachelor’s degrees on average. Private four-year institutions awarded an average of 624 
bachelor’s degrees. Community colleges awarded roughly 130 associate’s degrees and 
126 certificates. As displayed in Table 9, each credential is separated by race and 





Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Academic Support* 1639.192 2655.512 0 33375.91 6,858
Instruction* 12372.83 13217.28 0 13217.28 6,858
Federal Operating Grants* 4147.15 4147.15 0 742705.8 6,858
Federal Grants Other* 328.3694 2913.779 0 180000 6,858
Total Operating Revenues* 23192.72 65346.52 0 2957668 6,858
Local Appropriations* 5404.669 10934.88 0 126528.3 6,858
State Appropriations* 10562.25 12990.53 0 461000 6,858
Federal Appropriations* 160.8167 1725.014 0 1725.014 6,858
State Operating Grants* 1631.661 2806.125 0 46861.71 6,858
Tuition & Fees* 5789.115 7210.234 0 120500 6,858
Pell Grants* 2880.849 3400.988 0 50797.23 6,858
State Need-Based Aid* 158467.9 214019.1 0 886020.1 6,858
State Merit-Based Aid* 50685.48 97550.96 0 479420 6,858
Total full-time, first time enrollment 5122.825 7010.148 0 378162 6,858
In-state Tuition and Fees 1983.895 1322.158 0 12855 6,858
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees 4589.054 4589.054 0 18782 6,858
State per Capita Income 31687.84 5218.525 20563 54191 6,858
State unemployment rate 5.1045 1.0273 2.3 8.1416 6,858
Percent of state age 25 or older with 











Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Total BA, public four year 1659.52 1991.626 0 13230 5,599
Total BA, private four year 642.1422 1217.52 0 18231 13,251
Latino/a BA, public four year 168.5353 390.6823 0 6163 5,599
Latino/a BA, private four year 30.0575 86.5785 0 1482 13,251
Asian American & Pacific Islander 
BA, public four year 122.3815 343.2835 0 3477 5,599
Asian American & Pacific Islander 
BA, private four year 19.1218 68.4291 0 1476 13,251
White BA, public four year 1074.353 1351.918 0 9249 5,599
White BA, private four year 224.7583 380.2689 0 6296 13,251
Black BA, public four year 141.9911 207.5115 0 1736 5,599
Black BA, private four year 29.8412 69.4286 0 1255 13,251
American Indian & Alaska Native 
BA, public four year 11.0973 26.6806 0 370 5,599
American Indian & Alaska Native 
BA, private four year 1.5592 3.6587 0 54 13,251
Non-resident alien BA, public four 
year 51.7769 114.5614 0 1535 5,599
Non-resident alien BA, private four 
year 14.1362 41.6176 0 827 13,251
Total AS 128.6886 522.0921 0 39341 8,573
Latino/a AS 18.4005 116.304 0 7958 8,573
White AS 75.03105 290.045 0 19086 8,573
Asian American & Pacific Islander 
AS 6.092 33.7789 0 1282 8,573
American Indian & Alaska Native AS 2.0444 12.4734 0 702 8,573
Black AS 16.0743 84.692 0 6031 8,573
Non-resident alien AS 2.2519 18.3016 0 974 8,573
Total Certificates 126.0025 316.4689 0 10447 8,573
Latino/a Certificates 25.0564 133.9818 0 10155 8,573
White Certificates 62.2892 171.8449 0 8150 8,573
Asian American & Pacific Islander 
Certificates 5.2361 27.04356 0 1858 8,573
American Indian & Alaska Native 
Certificates 1.3229 7.0084 0 475 8,573
Black Certificates 22.5809 75.4047 0 2136 8,573




Table 10:  














Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Academic Support* 26058.79 48072.53 0 619181.6 5,666
Instruction* 102990.1 149861.2 0 1891603 5,492
Federal Operating Grants* 30444.06 75676.16 0 1092973 5,492
Federal Grants Other* 1806.63 4926.183 0 74432.63 5,492
Total Operating Revenues* 234738.6 510455.7 118.911 5742412 5,492
Local Appropriations* 697.574 5850.957 0 124164 5,492
State Appropriations* 72760.89 95144.71 0 684235 5,492
Federal Appropriations* 2667.017 31274.81 0 598426.4 5,492
State Operating Grants* 7752.695 15792.13 0 152928 5,492
Tuition & Fees* 75740.68 113063.4 0 1021014 5,492
Pell Grants* 13615.86 14128.95 0 174629.9 5,492
State Need-Based Aid* 282241.3 386260 0 1902162 5,525
State Merit-Based Aid* 69977.12 145931.1 0 766979.9 5,525
Total full-time, first time enrollment 9527.82 8950.083 1 66701 5,492
In-state Tuition and Fees 6575.927 6575.927 0 17945 5,639
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees 15128.24 6817.369 0 43377 5,639
State per Capita Income 42961.26 7101.558 29801 74094 5,525
State unemployment rate 7.0381 2.0658 2.6833 12.1417 5,525
Percent of state age 25 or older with 




















Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
State Grants* 1014.885 1848 0 26355.52 12,764
Federal Operating Grants* 4846.493 24690.77 0 463666.9 12,764
Federal Grants Other* 694.9329 2807.003 0 81628.21 12,764
Academic Support* 410.3677 3361.5 0 299425 12,764
Instruction* 32264.87 120209.9 0 2310502 12,764
Total Operating Revenues* 108460 473347.9 0 9150248 12,764
Local Appropriations* 3.199 53.305 0 1448.776 12,764
State Appropriations* 194.7935 1498.695 0 36627 12,764
Federal Appropriations* 176.1306 4756.923 0 163794.3 12,764
Tuition & Fees* 38379.61 84433.6 0 1599844 12,764
Pell Grants* 2312.405 2312.405 0 110724.2 12,764
State Need-Based Aid* 370532.7 455240.5 0 1902162 13,005
State Merit-Based Aid* 53644.41 119420.9 0 766979.9 13,005
Total full-time, first time enrollment 1984.701 2943.305 1 49744 11,108
In-state Tuition and Fees 18207.38 12625.81 0 55748 13,135
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees 18216.49 12618.91 0 55748 13,135
State per Capita Income 44414.66 7329.139 29801 74094 13,005
State unemployment rate 7.0381 2.0658 2.6833 12.1417 13,005
Percent of state age 25 or older with 






Average of control variables included in Title III analysis, public two-year institutions, 
2007-2015 
 
Table 13 presents average statistical information for the upward mobility outcome 
variables. These represent the average percentage of those students who complete a 
credential and move up in economic quartiles ten years following the completion of the 
credential. The highest mean rates are seen in those rising from the bottom quintile and 
up two quintiles. As seen in Table 13, about 20 percent of students increase by two 
income quintiles from public four-year institutions. In community colleges, 
approximately 20 percent on average also rise by two quintiles. 17 percent on average 
increase by this measure in private four-year colleges and universities.  
 
 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Academic Support* 3921.779 5425.14 0 82769.84 8,646
Instruction* 20833.95 22532.9 157.529 265100.6 8,314
Federal Operating Grants* 1844.987 1844.987 0 56720.48 8,314
Federal Grants Other* 464.7734 1332.643 0 32667.87 8,314
Total Operating Revenues* 15394.76 16819.59 0 198373.9 8,314
Local Appropriations* 8983.359 17281.01 0 190805.9 8,314
State Appropriations* 13146.77 14924.86 0 237788 8,314
Federal Appropriations* 72.67623 633.802 0 15874.79 8,314
State Operating Grants* 2863.976 2863.976 0 39968.89 8,314
Tuition & Fees* 8681.496 11483.66 0 146425.9 8,314
Pell Grants* 8543.469 10657.8 0 240238 8,314
State Need-Based Aid* 327033.7 466043.6 0 1902162 8,571
State Merit-Based Aid* 70070.97 142577.6 0 766979.9 8,571
Total full-time, first time enrollment 6307.305 7213.222 14 100272 8,602
In-state Tuition and Fees 3230.068 1769.844 0 13412 7,858
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees 6607.381 2890.525 0 23703 7,858
State per Capita Income 42252.01 6755.355 6755.355 68329 8,571
State unemployment rate 7.0381 2.0658 2.6833 12.1417 8,571
Percent of state age 25 or older with 










Title V: College Completion 
 
Tables 14-21 include results from the second stage of fuzzy regression 
discontinuity estimates of the relationship between the Title V HSI federal grant and 
college completion measures. These estimates include those for undergraduate students in 
public four-year institutions, private four-year institutions, and public two-year 
institutions using a two-stage least squares estimator. The estimates of the impact of Title 
V funding directly on the regression discontinuity design for all completion measures and 
all students in public four-year institutions and are shown in Table 14. Table 14 presents 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Increase by two, Public four year 0.2053 0.0762 0.0712 0.506 441
Increase by two, Private four year 0.1689 0.0606 0.0534 0.567 794
Increase by two, Public two year 0.1962 0.0507 0.0943 0.4132 686
1 to 5, Public four year 0.0232 0.017 0.0004 0.1293 441
1 to 5, Private four year 0.0171 0.0122 0 0.1635 794
1 to 5, Public two year 0.0164 0.0094 0.0002 0.0708 686
1 to 4, Public four year 0.0273 0.0197 0 0.129 441
1 to 4, Private four year 0.0177 0.0137 0 0.1161 794
1 to 4, Public two year 0.0298 0.0135 0.0058 0.1097 686
1 to 3, Public four year 0.026 0.0218 0.0004 0.1336 441
1 to 3, Private four year 0.0157 0.0169 0 0.1552 794
1 to 3, Public two year 0.0441 0.0235 0.0065 0.1353 686
2 to 4, Public four year 0.0408 0.0176 0.0053 0.0988 441
2 to 4, Private four year 0.0321 0.0171 0.0019 0.0019 794
2 to 4, Public two year 0.0426 0.0108 0.0152 785 686
2 to 5, Public four year 0.036 0.0161 0.0079 0.1283 441
2 to 5, Private four year 0.0323 0.0148 0.0005 0.1321 794
2 to 5, Public two year 0.026 0.0097 0.0014 0.0676 686
3 to 5, Public four year 0.052 0.0161 0.0151 0.1228 441
3 to 5, Private four year 0.0539 0.02 0.0045 0.1767 794




the results of all completion measures and all students in public four-year institutions. All 
results from first-stage regression discontinuity design are included in Appendix B. 
Throughout the analysis of Title V grant funding, the results provide some 
evidence that HSIs have a slightly higher percentage of college credential completion 
measures when compared to the HSIs just below the enrollment cutoff. This could 
indicate that Title V grant funding causes a modest increase in college completion as 
defined by credential or degree production. This finding varies based on specific 
credential degree and institutional sector. It also differs depending on the particular 
outcome variable and especially when this variable is disaggregated by race and 
ethnicity. 
When analyzing the impact of Title V funding on any credential completion for 
all students, there are statistically significant results in public four and two-year 
institutions. As seen in Table 14 there is a significant effect on credential production in 
private four-year HSIs (0.03). This indicates that all credentials were higher in private 
four-year HSIs near the enrollment cutoff by approximately three percent when 
controlling for all other factors that could have an impact on the college completion 
outcomes included in this study when compared to private four-year emerging HSIs 









Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all races and 
ethnicities and all credentials by sector 
 
 
All races, all 
credentials, public 
four year
All races, all 
credentials, private 
four year
All races, all 
credentials, public 
two year
HSI/Treatment -0.0593 0.0289** -0.0103
(0.0666) (0.0097) (0.0305)
Latino/a Enrollment 1.1679 -2.8937* 0.2786
(1.1508) (1.1429) (0.2786)
Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees 0.0660 0.3029*** -0.0073
(0.0467) (0.0386) (0.0417)
Federal Operating Grants 0.0746** 0.0221 0.0122
(0.0268) (0.0721) (0.0107)
Other Federal Operating Grants -0.0226 0.0253 -0.0016
(0.0204) (0.0171) (0.0136)
State Operating Grants -0.0147 -0.0029 -0.0160
(0.0186) (0.0096) (0.0093)
Federal Appropriations -0.0161 0.0044 0.0094
(0.0156) (0.0820) (0.0129)
State Appropriations 0.0719* 0.0001 -0.0318*
(0.0328) (0.0009) (0.0130)
Local Appropriations -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0029
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0055)
Instructional Expenses 0.0581 0.098* 0.1543***
(0.0541) (0.0450) (0.0438)
Academic Support 0.0566 0.0266 0.0140
(0.0520) (0.0294) (0.0196)
Total Operating Revenues 0.0186 -0.1579*** -0.1043
(0.0693) (0.0457) (0.0538)
Instutional Enrollment
Total full-time, first time enrollment 0.8037*** 0.8344*** 0.8215***
(0.0418) (0.0235) (0.0287)
Percent of part-time students -0.7821*** 0.3512** -0.7086***
(0.1906) (0.1206) (0.1344)
Percent of students of color -0.1088 0.1845 -0.4706***
(0.1412) (0.1171) (0.1104)
Student Financial Aid
Pell Grants -0.1397*** -0.1834*** 0.0885***
(0.0322) (0.0189) (0.0210)
State Need-Based Aid 0.0357*** -0.0109 -0.0276**
(0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0102)
State Merit-Based Aid -0.0178*** -0.0103** 0.0216***
(0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0032)
Institutional Characteristics
Selectivity -0.0039 -0.0033* -0.0027
(0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0017)
In-state Tuition and Fees 0.3884*** -1.5603* -0.1088**
(0.1012) (0.7519) (0.0413)







When focusing specifically on baccalaureate degree production, evidence of a 
significant impact occurs in private four-year HSIs. As displayed in Table 15, private 
four-year HSIs just above the enrollment cutoff had roughly one percent more bachelor’s 
degrees recipients when compared to emerging private four-year HSIs. Federal HSI 
funding could also be related to an increase in associate’s degrees in HSI community 
colleges. As seen in Table 15, there were approximately three percent more associate’s 
degrees amongst students of all races and ethnicities in two-year HSIs when compared to 
non-HSIs near the cutoff. Bachelor’s degrees in public institutions and community 
college certificates did not appear to be statistically related to Title V funding and 




All races, all 
credentials, public 
four year
All races, all 
credentials, private 
four year




Per capita Income -0.1667 0.0266 0.0787
(0.2343) (0.1904) (0.1752)
State unemployment rate -0.026 0.0072 -0.0011
(0.0612) (0.0963) (0.0942)
Percent of state age 25 or older with 
bachelor's degree 0.0719 0.0356 0.0961
(0.0357) (0.0432) (0.1180)
Constant 1.1504 -1.5188 -0.3418
(2.7651) (2.1579) (1.8361)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 626 1337 1174
R-squared 0.7997 0.7610 0.7373
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all races and 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students







In-state Tuition and Fees












 All races, 
certificates, 
public two year
0.0129 0.0274* .0543* 0.0202
(0.0734) (0.0051) (0.0263) (0.0269)
-2.2249 1.2058 -0.7331 0.9562*
(1.3135) (0.6440) (0.4503) (0.4521)
0.2129** 0.1331*** 0.0848 -0.2476***
(0.0765) (0.0357) (0.0681) (0.0684)
0.0707 0.0121 -0.0693** -0.0273
(0.0442) (0.0250) (0.0244) (0.0244)
-0.0777* 0.0433** -0.0074 -0.0420
(0.0336) (0.0154) (0.0272) -(0.0420)
-0.0266 0.0221* -0.0437* -0.0889***
(0.0305) (0.0086) (0.0217) (0.0218)
-0.0069 0.0024 -0.0805** -0.0766**
(0.0257) (0.0280) (0.0255) (0.0256)
-0.0292 0.0012 0.0373 0.0256
(0.0542) (0.0092) (0.0235) (0.0236)
-0.0796** -0.0059 0.1509*** 0.1754***
(0.0297) (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0175)
-0.0026 0.0049 -0.3113*** 0.3470***
(0.0884) (0.0407) (0.0754) (0.0756)
0.0525 0.0326 0.0390 -0.1574***
(0.0847) (0.0942) (0.0337) (0.0338)
0.0873 -0.0414 0.0249 -0.1123
(0.1145) (0.0417) (0.0893) (0.0897)
0.8756*** 0.9134*** 0.2810*** 0.2027***
(0.0656) (0.0215) (0.0194) (0.0194)
-2.9455*** -0.1023 1.3045*** 0.8974***
(0.3064) (0.1101) (0.1146) (0.1150)
0.1425 -0.3619*** 0.1155 0.3820***
(0.2221) (0.1084) (0.1028) (0.1032)
-0.1663*** -0.0351* 0.3474*** 0.3683***
(0.0494) (0.0174) (424.0000) (0.0426)
-0.0066 -0.0022 -0.0386*** -0.0162
(0.0182) (0.0109) (0.0117) (0.0116)
-0.0251*** -0.0063* 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0070) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0035)
-0.0274*** -0.0091*** 0.0395*** -0.0073***
(0.0044) (0.0015) (15.0000) (0.0015)
0.0774 0.7214 -0.2435** -0.3322***
(0.1651) (0.6986) (0.0913) (0.0916)
-0.1547 -0.6321 .2387** 0.0492






A different picture emerges when disaggregating college completion outcome 
variables by race and ethnicity. The assumption would be that an HSI should have a 
larger number of Latino/a students receiving college credentials when compared to non-
HSIs, as these students are the target student population for many federally funded 
programs in HSIs. As seen in Table 16, this assumption is largely supported through this 
study’s findings. In each completion category, there is a highly statistically significant 
relationship between Title V funding and Latino/a students obtaining credentials and 
degrees. Public four-year HSIs produced approximately ten percent more bachelor’s 
degrees compared to emerging public four-year HSIs.  Private four-year HSIs had twelve 
percent more bachelor’s degrees than private four-hear emerging HSIs. Both associate’s 
degrees and certificates in public HSI community colleges were roughly seven percent 
higher than those credentials in non-HSI community colleges. These results mostly held 


























Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
0.5652 -0.3926* -0.5828** 0.2604
(0.3659) (0.1700) (0.1926) (0.1933)
-0.0794 -0.1091 0.0983 -0.0501
(0.0812) (0.1266) (0.1480) (0.1072)
-0.0811 0.0752 0.0411 0.0722
(0.0962) (0.0653) (0.0718) (0.0838)
-6.8021 1.9291 5.5344** 0.2873
(3.9366) (1.7635) (1.9626) (1.9701)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all Latino/a completers 




Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0634*** 0.0706*** 0.0799*** 0.0984***
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0084)
-10.4025*** -8.2425** -0.6733** 2.1616***
(2.9013) (2.6714) (0.2605) (0.3181)
0.2220 0.0070 0.2774*** 0.1462*
(0.1176) (0.0901) (0.0468) (0.0572)
0.0542 0.0444 -0.0561*** -0.0482*
(0.0676) (0.0666) (0.0175) (0.0214)
-0.0042 0.0571 0.0208 -0.0196
(0.0515) (0.0399) (0.0196) (0.0239)
0.0420 -0.0753*** 0.0156 -0.0665***
(0.0468) (0.0224) (0.0152) (0.0185)
-0.0150 -0.0111 -0.0427* -0.0341
(0.0393) (0.0999) (0.0184) (0.0224)
-0.0968 -0.0622 -0.0432* -0.0307
(0.0827) (0.0966) (0.0171) (0.0209)
-0.1045 -0.1045 0.0576*** 0.0041
(0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0111) (0.0136)
0.3405* 0.1991 0.0256 0.2477***
(0.1364) (0.1051) (0.0549) (0.0671)
-0.3189* 0.0116 -0.0163 0.0241
(0.1311) (0.0282) (0.0245) (0.0299)
0.0725 -0.0504 -0.1987** -0.2372**
(0.1748) (0.1067) (0.0650) (0.0794)
1.0725*** .6299*** 0.1215*** 0.1919***
(0.1053) (0.0548) (0.0142) (0.0174)
-0.4108 0.1189 0.0214 -0.1039
(0.4804) (0.2818) (0.0810) (0.0989)
0.0377 -0.3049 0.1795* 0.2535**
(0.3559) (0.2737) (0.0750) (0.0915)
-0.3457*** -0.0649 -0.0270 -0.0694
(0.0811) (0.0443) (0.0293) (0.0358)
0.0571* 0.0593* 0.0074 -0.0102
(0.0281) (0.0275) (0.0084) (0.0103)
-0.0294** -0.0181* 0.0022 -0.0035






An interesting empirical pattern appears when the model is estimated for 
subsamples of the primary research design sample based on race and ethnicity beyond 
Latino/a students. Tables 17-21 display the findings when this analysis is disaggregated 
for non-Latino/a races and ethnicities in public four and two-year HSIs and private four-
year HSIs. 
As displayed in Table 17, there is a highly statistically significant relationship 






















In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0062 -0.0111** 0.0021 -0.0093***
(0.0069) (0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0014)
-0.9677*** 0.9429 -0.0672 -0.0337
(0.2550) (1.7570) (0.0646) (0.0788)
0.7458** -1.0419 0.0016 -0.1108
(0.2400) (1.7587) (0.0650) (0.0794)
4.082*** 2.2628*** 1.0694*** 1.0279***
(0.5907) (0.4450) (0.1395) (0.1703)
-0.0990 -0.1094 0.0665 -0.0452
(0.0721) (0.1269) (0.146) (0.1072)
-0.0669 0.0450 0.0367 0.0511
(0.0800) (0.0998) (0.0615) (0.0427)
-53.1050*** -30.2868*** -12.2488*** -9.2589***
(6.9712) (5.0439) (1.4351) (1.7520)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
626 1337 1174 1174




sectors included in this study. Asian American and Pacific Islander students obtained 
eight percent more baccalaureate degrees from both public four-year schools and private 
four-year HSIs when compared to those sectors in non-HSIs. This student population had 
three percent more associate’s degrees and four percent more community college 
certificates as compared to Asian American and Pacific Islander students in non-HSI 





















Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all Asian American 




Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0880*** 0.0807*** 0.0910*** 0.0599***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006)
-13.5123*** -7.9459*** -0.8588*** -1.3375***
(2.7808) (2.0826) (0.1787) (0.2138)
0.1765 -0.0742 0.2852*** 0.0362*
(0.0647) (0.0702) (0.0321) (0.0372)
-0.0051 -0.0066 -0.0499*** -0.0282*
(0.0493) (0.0245) (0.0120) (0.0014)
-0.0051 0.0518 0.0524*** -0.0086
(0.0493) (0.0311) (0.0134) (0.0039)
0.0872 -0.0817*** 0.0283** -0.4665***
(0.0449) (0.0175) (0.0104) (0.0075)
0.0133 0.0342 -0.0200 -0.0141
(0.0376) (0.0661) (0.0126) (0.0024)
-0.0776 -0.0679 -0.0494*** -0.0107
(0.0793) (0.0881) (0.0117) (0.0209)
-0.0604 -0.0422 0.0660*** 0.0011
(0.0435) (0.0490) (0.0076) (0.0026)
0.2316 0.2836*** -0.0350*** 0.0477***
(0.1307) (0.0819) (0.0063) (0.0471)
-0.2579* -0.0446 -0.0013 0.0041
(0.1256) (0.0892) (0.0168) (0.0099)
0.2319 0.0177 -0.2659*** -0.0372**
(0.1675) (0.0832) (0.0446) (0.0594)
1.2679*** 0.6270*** 0.1106*** 0.0819***
(0.1009) (0.0427) (0.0097) (0.0064)
0.1490 -0.2914 0.1489** -0.0039
(0.4605) (0.2197) (0.0556) (0.0789)
0.9075 0.0560 0.2626*** 0.0535**
(0.3411) (0.2134) (0.0514) (0.0005)
-0.5030*** -0.1707*** -0.0350 -0.0394
(0.0777) (0.0345) (0.0201) (0.0258)
0.0658* 0.0475* 0.0022 -0.0820
(0.0269) (0.0214) (0.0058) (0.0830)
-0.0265* -0.0265*** -0.0037* -0.0015






Results for the other racial and ethnic groups varied. Throughout all sectors of 
postsecondary education, American Indian and Alaska Native students tend to display 
lower graduation rates. Title V-grant funding appears to have led to increases in their 
college completion as displayed in Table 18. There was a four percent increase in 
American Indian and Alaska Native students obtaining bachelor’s degrees from public 
four-year HSIs and a two percent increase in these students being awarded community 






















In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0038 -0.0068* 0.0031*** -0.0093***
(0.0066) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0001)
-0.9462*** 1.7279 -0.4028*** -0.0137
(0.2444) (1.3701) (0.0443) (0.0788)
0.901*** -1.8195 0.3552*** -0.0098
(0.2301) (1.3711) (0.0446) (0.0594)
4.2992*** 2.1996*** 1.0868*** 1.0012***
(0.5661) (0.3469) (0.0957) (0.0822)
-0.1200 -0.1281 0.1188 -0.0702
(0.1291) (0.1266) (0.1989) (0.0991)
-0.0758 0.0822 0.0252 0.0528
(0.0743) (0.0942) (0.0506) (0.0504)
-60.5988*** -29.2249*** -12.3425*** -10.5463***
(6.6817) (3.9322) (0.9844) (2.9987)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all American Indian 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants



























0.0873*** 0.0257 0.0477 0.0109*
(0.0014) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0097)
-6.4019*** -0.7367 -0.0677 0.3566
(1.8908) (0.9351) (0.2911) (0.3658)
0.0362* 0.1644** 0.0399 0.1622*
(0.0172) (0.0266) (0.0473) (0.0922)
-0.0282* 0.0608 0.0782 0.0882*
(0.0014) (0.0346) (0.0864) (0.0184)
-0.0086 -0.0455* .0419* -0.0631*
(0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0154) (0.0271)
-0.4665*** -0.0066 0.0041 -0.0207
(0.0075) (0.0205) (0.0043) (0.0237)
-0.0141 -0.0086 0.0090 -0.0051
(0.0024) (0.0257) (0.2550) (0.0183)
-0.0107 -0.0292 -0.0122 -0.0384
(0.0009) (0.0342) (0.0595) (0.0495)
0.0011 -0.0596** -0.0424* -0.0687*
(0.0026) (0.0097) (0.0198) (0.0227)
0.1377*** -0.0006 0.0990 0.1007
(0.0521) (0.0284) (0.0869) (0.0881)
0.0041 0.0225 -0.0566 -0.0778
(0.0099) (0.0347) (0.0882) (0.0843)
-0.1172** 0.0573 -0.0502 0.0859








Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students





0.0819*** 0.6656*** 0.9332*** 0.8296***
(0.0024) (0.0246) (0.0349) (0.0658)
-0.0039 -2.0455*** 0.3939* -2.0040***
(0.0489) (0.1264) (0.1793) (0.3157)
0.1235** 0.1025 -3.9489*** -3.1194***
(0.0005) (0.1721) (0.1741) (0.2161)
-0.0394 -0.1063*** -0.0533 -0.0852**
(0.0258) (0.0294) (0.0282) (0.0183)
-0.0820 -0.0456 -0.0102 0.0003
(0.0830) (0.0062) (0.0175) (0.0102)
-0.0015 -0.0021*** -0.0126* -0.0097*
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0027)
Institutional Characteristics
Selectivity
In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0063*** -0.0044*** -0.0076*** -0.0091***
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0029)
-0.0137 0.0474 0.3085 -0.0952
(0.0588) (0.1251) (1.1181) (0.0835)
-0.0098 -0.1147 0.2972 0.0078
(0.0594) (0.1052) (1.1189) (0.1427)
1.0008*** 0.4252 -0.0019 1.1231**
(0.0822) (0.1359) (0.2831) (0.4051)
-0.0978 -0.1192 0.0884 -0.0992
(0.0614) (0.1263) (0.1882) (0.1144)
-0.0120 0.0204 0.0141 0.0483
(0.0369) (0.0888) (0.0495) (0.0717)
-7.2608 -0.6792 -1.6354 -2.7435
(4.5432) (1.7656) (1.6033) (2.0146)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
626 1337 1174 1174




Black students also tend to graduate at a lower rate when compared to other races 
and ethnicities. As displayed in Table 19, there is evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between HSI funding and Black students graduating from HSIs in some 
completion variables. There was a four percent increase in Black students obtaining 
public baccalaureate degrees, a five percent increase in Black students earning bachelor’s 
degrees from private not-for-profit four-year HSIs, and a two percent increase for Black 
students obtaining community college certificates in HSIs when compared to Black 



















Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all Black and African 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0641*** 0.0693*** 0.4778 0.0109*
(0.0012) (0.0020) (0.7729) (0.0097)
-10.6807*** -8.1926*** -0.0677 0.3566
(1.9383) (1.5054) (0.2911) (0.3658)
0.1224 0.0060 0.1852*** -0.2276***
(0.1276) (0.0801) (0.0221) (0.0644)
0.0442 0.0344 -0.0399*** -0.0223
(0.0576) (0.0566) (0.0020) (0.0204)
-0.0032 0.0471 0.0424*** -0.0320
(0.0415) (0.0299) (0.0034) -(0.0310)
0.0320 -0.0653*** 0.0263** -0.0789***
(0.0368) (0.0124) (0.0094) (0.0118)
-0.0140 -0.0011 -0.0100 -0.0666**
(0.0383) (0.0899) (0.0116) (0.0156)
-0.0868 -0.0522 -0.0394*** 0.0156
(0.0727) (0.0866) (0.0017) (0.0136)
-0.0945 -0.0945 0.0560*** 0.1454***
(0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0006) (0.0075)
0.3305* 0.0991 -0.0250*** 0.3270***
(0.1253) (0.0951) (0.0023) (0.0726)
-0.2189* 0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0574***
(0.0311) (0.0182) (0.0068) (0.0038)
0.0625 -0.0404 -0.2559*** -0.1023
(0.1648) (0.0967) (0.0346) (0.0797)
1.0525*** .5299*** 0.1006*** 0.1027***
(0.0953) (0.0448) (0.0017) (0.0094)
-0.3108 0.1089 0.1389** 0.7974***
(0.3804) (0.2718) (0.0456) (0.0150)
0.0277 -0.2949 0.2226*** 0.2820***
(0.2559) (0.1737) (0.0114) (0.0032)
-0.2457*** -0.0549 -0.0250 0.2683***
(0.0611) (0.0343) (0.0301) (0.0226)
0.0471* 0.0493* 0.0012 -0.0062
(0.0181) (0.0175) (0.0048) (0.0016)
-0.0194** -0.0081* -0.0027* -0.0001






As presented in Table 20, the relationship between federal HSI funding and 
completion measures amongst White students was most pronounced in bachelor’s 
degrees in private four-year HSIs (six percent higher in HSIs compared to non-HSIs). 
There was a four percent higher number of bachelor’s degrees in public four-year HSIs 
compared to non-HSIs and two percent more community college certificates in HSIs. 
Enrollment of non-resident alien students has been steadily increasing through 






















In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0052 -0.0011** 0.0021*** -0.0133***
(0.0059) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0005)
-0.8677*** 0.9329 -0.3028*** -0.2322***
(0.1550) (1.7470) (0.0243) (0.0416)
0.6458** -1.0319 0.2552*** 0.0392
(0.1400) (1.6587) (0.0246) (0.0827)
3.0222*** 2.1628*** 1.0264*** 0.1604
(0.3812) (0.3450) (0.0846) (0.0933)
-0.0799 -0.1098 0.0988 -0.0502
(0.0894) (0.1265) (0.1480) (0.1078)
-0.0999 0.0114 0.0110 0.0521
(0.0924) (0.0200) (0.0501) (0.0926)
-15.5943*** -13.4514*** -1.6354 -2.7435
(4.6574) (2.8424) (1.6033) (2.0146)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
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also appear to have been positively affected by Title V funding. As Table 21 displays, 
there was a three percent increase in non-resident alien students obtaining bachelor’s 
degrees from public four-year HSIs, a four percent increase in private four-year HSIs 
bachelor’s degree attainment, a one percent increase in these students earning associate’s 






















Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all White, non-





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0681** 0.0263*** 1.0122 0.0109*
(0.0020) (0.0005) (1.6640) (0.0097)
-5.3918* -5.1361** -2.2245 1.0412***
(2.0879) (1.6995) (1.2335) (0.1222)
0.1807* 0.0499 0.2644** 0.0462*
(0.0846) (0.0573) (0.0966) (0.0472)
0.0983* 0.0882 0.0708 -0.0382*
(0.0486) (0.0964) (0.0446) (0.0114)
-0.0731* .0619* -0.0555* -0.0096
(0.0371) (0.0254) (0.0226) (0.0139)
-0.0307 0.0051 -0.0166 -0.5665***
(0.0337) (0.0143) (0.0405) (0.0085)
-0.0151 0.0100 -0.0096 -0.0241
(0.0283) (0.3660) (0.0357) (0.0124)
-0.0484 -0.0222 -0.0392 -0.0207
(0.0595) (0.0495) (0.0442) (0.0109)
-0.0787* -0.0524* -0.0696** 0.0021
(0.0327) (0.0398) (0.0197) (0.0036)
0.1107 0.1090 -0.0016 0.1477***
(0.0981) (0.0669) (0.0784) (0.0571)
-0.0878 -0.0666 0.0425 0.0141
(0.0943) (0.0982) (0.0747) (0.0199)
0.0959 -0.0402 0.0673 -0.1372**
(0.1258) (0.0679) (0.1045) (0.0694)
0.9296*** 0.9332*** 0.7756*** 0.0919***
(0.0758) (0.0349) (0.0556) (0.0074)
-2.0240*** 0.3939* -2.8455*** -0.0139
(0.3457) (0.1793) (0.2964) (0.0889)
-3.1494*** -3.9489*** 0.1425 0.1535**
(0.2561) (0.1741) (0.2221) (0.0015)
-0.1852** -0.0533 -0.1563*** -0.0494
(0.0583) (0.0282) (0.0594) (0.0358)
0.0013 -0.0102 -0.0566 -0.0920
(0.0202) (0.0175) (0.0082) (0.0930)
-0.0197* -0.0126* -0.0151*** -0.0025


































In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0191*** -0.0076*** -0.0174*** -0.0083***
(0.0049) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0004)
-0.1052 0.3085 0.0674 -0.0237
(0.1835) (1.1181) (0.1551) (0.0688)
0.0098 0.2972 -0.1447 -0.0108
(0.1727) (1.1189) (0.1452) (0.0694)
1.1631** -0.0019 0.5552 1.0112***
(0.4251) (0.2831) (0.3559) (0.0922)
-0.0793 -0.1092 0.0989 -0.0905
(0.0844) (0.1266) (0.1883) (0.1066)
-0.0322 0.0132 0.0244 0.0229
(0.0428) (0.0266) (0.0326) (0.0312)
-14.9576** -3.9836 -1.6354 -2.7435
(5.0168) (3.2089) (1.6033) (2.0146)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
1174 1174





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all Non-resident 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0859* 0.0589* .0153** 0.0805**
(0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0027)
-4.1635* -3.7101* -0.2589 -0.1429
(2.0736) (1.7239) (0.1343) (0.1040)
0.1652 0.0332*** 0.1651*** 0.1261*
(0.0856) (0.0252) (0.0120) (0.0470)
-0.0041 0.0024 -0.0298*** -0.0280*
(0.0393) (0.0151) (0.0011) (0.0112)
-0.0041 0.0332** 0.0322*** -0.0094
(0.0393) (0.0052) (0.0012) (0.0138)
0.0772 0.0120* 0.0162** -0.0464***
(0.0349) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0165)
0.0033 0.0014 -0.0091 -0.0247
(0.0276) (0.0180) (0.0102) (0.0124)
-0.0676 0.0010 -0.0292*** -0.0206
(0.0693) (0.0082) (0.0010) (0.0108)
-0.0504 -0.0029 0.0460*** 0.0028
(0.0535) (0.0072) (0.0002) (0.0102)
0.2016 0.0029 -0.0150*** 0.1489***
(0.1107) (0.0207) (0.0012) (0.0572)
-0.1579* 0.0126 -0.0002 0.0142
(0.1056) (0.0742) (0.0056) (0.0199)
0.1319 -0.0214 -0.1558*** -0.1378**
(0.1175) (0.0217) (0.0144) (0.0692)
1.0679*** 0.9034*** 0.0094*** 0.1820***
(0.0099) (0.0205) (0.0002) (0.0206)
0.1290 -0.0921 0.1182** -0.0938
(0.3605) (0.1002) (0.0362) (0.0782)
0.8075 -0.3417*** 0.1223*** 0.2232**
(0.2411) (0.0982) (0.0098) (0.0612)
-0.4030*** -0.0250* -0.0144 -0.0492
(0.0677) (0.0072) (0.0102) (0.0152)
0.0558* -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0098
(0.0169) (0.0980) (0.0082) (0.0096)
-0.0065* -0.0042* -0.0017* -0.0015






Title III: College Completion 
 
While Title V of the Higher Education focuses exclusively on HSIs, Title III in 
relation to Strengthening Institutions directs funding to several categories of MSIs. As 
explained in the chapter three, this study uses a multiple cutoff regression discontinuity 
design to account for the many enrollment thresholds at which these institutions become 






















In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0028 -0.0070*** 0.0019*** -0.0064***
(0.0056) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0004)
-0.8462*** 0.7012 -0.2926*** -0.0236
(0.1444) (0.5968) (0.0146) (0.0882)
0.8012*** -0.5322 0.1558*** -0.1004
(0.1301) (0.5998) (0.0140) (0.0695)
3.2992*** -0.2924* 0.9262*** 1.0004***
(0.4662) (0.1922) (0.0488) (0.1408)
-0.1284 -0.1662 0.1024 -0.0401
(0.2802) (0.1843) (0.1048) (0.1029)
-0.0326 0.0414 0.0191 0.0480
(0.0486) (0.0655) (0.0527) (0.0793)
-20.1128*** -14.4674*** -5.9483*** -2.1861***
(4.9825) (3.2550) (0.7397) (0.5728)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
626 1337 1174 1174




Tables 22-29 include results from the second stage of fuzzy regression 
discontinuity estimates of the relationship between Title III federal MSI grants and 
college completion measures for undergraduate students in public four-year institutions, 
private four-year institutions, and public two-year institutions using a two-stage least 
squares estimator. Results from the impact of Title III funding on the regression 
discontinuity design for all completion measures and all students in public four-year 
institutions and are shown in Table 22. This includes public four-year, private four-year, 
and public two-year institutions categorized as MSIs according to Title III. All results 
from the first-stage of the fuzzy regression discontinuity design are included in Appendix 
B. 
As in the case of Title V funding, Title III funding towards MSIs appears to 
provide evidence that Title III funding causes an increase in college completion as 
defined by credential or degree production. This finding varies based on specific 
credential degree and institutional sector. It also differs depending on the particular 












Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all races and 
ethnicities and all credentials by sector 
 
 












MSI/Treatment 0.0166 0.0148 0.0972
(0.8556) (0.3622) (0.5554)
Minority Enrollment -0.2228 9.8996 3.8325
(1.0137) (21.2805) (0.8464)
Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees 0.0114 -0.0978 -0.1662
(0.0236) (0.1197) (0.2115)
Federal Operating Grants 0.01593** 0.0201 0.0347
(0.0055) (0.0166) (0.0581)
Other Federal Operating Grants 0.0126 -0.0689 0.1179
(0.0076) (0.0255) (0.1226)
State Operating Grants 0.0131** -0.0491*** 0.0257
(0.0049) (0.0462) (0.0368)
Federal Appropriations -0.0044 0.0407 -0.0341
(0.0058) (0.0488) (0.0462)
State Appropriations 0.0058 -0.0299 -0.1431*
(0.0064) (0.0366) (0.0636)
Local Appropriations -0.0077 0.1044*** 0.1188***
(0.0054) (0.0449) (0.0214)
Instructional Expenses 0.0502* 0.0205*** 0.0259
(0.0197) (0.0003) (0.1209)
Academic Support 0.0001 0.0208 -0.0035
(0.0009) (0.0533) (0.0660)
Total Operating Revenues -0.0297 0.0657 -0.1009
(0.0267) (0.0939) (0.1232)
Instutional Enrollment
Total full-time, first time enrollment 0.0260* 0.1258*** 0.1335***
(0.0132) (0.0678) (0.0230)
Percent of part-time students 0.1726** 0.5222*** .9202***
(0.0643) (0.0821) (0.0858)
Percent of students of color .9904*** 0.9157 2.1877*
(0.0206) (0.9772) (0.9634)
Student Financial Aid
Pell Grants -0.0191 0.4584*** 0.6197**
(0.0135) (0.0268) (0.0966)
State Need-Based Aid -0.0042 -0.0213 0.0063
(0.0023) (0.0092) (0.0050)







As displayed in Table 23, Title III MSIs showed an eight percent increase in 
associate’s degrees for all races and ethnicities compared to those institutions that did not 
receive Title III MSI funding. Completion of certificates in all Title III MSIs increased by 
four percent amongst all students. There was a statistically insignificant relationship 
between Title III MSI funding and completion of baccalaureate degrees in public and 
private four-year institutions. 
 













Selectivity 0.0001 0.0057*** 0.0086***
(0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0009)
In-state Tuition and Fees -0.0235 0.1078 -1.1398*
(0.0412) (0.1680) (0.0849)
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees 0.0278 0.8522 1.2170*
(0.0360) (0.2480) (0.0884)
State Characteristics
Per capita Income 0.2427** -0.1919*** -0.0887
(0.0770) (0.0024) (0.8262)
State unemployment rate -0.0660 0.0044 -0.0089
(0.0844) (0.0621) (0.0522)
Percent of state age 25 or older with 
bachelor's degree 0.0432 0.0536 0.0712
(0.0951) (0.0864) (0.1010)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant -2.8722*** -0.6645 -8.0582
(0.8224) (0.3419) (8.8556)
Observations 693 1,390 1,016
R-squared 0.6916 0.0689 0.2225
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all races and 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























-0.5479 0.1055 0.0376*** 0.0674***
(0.7938) (2.0002) (0.0664) (0.0034)
-0.9023 -0.0434 -0.9169*** -0.6002**
(0.4777) (0.3419) (0.2595) (0.2090)
0.2145 -0.1022 -0.1078 -0.1195
(0.1100) (0.0966) (0.0897) (0.0722)
-0.0048 -0.0256 0.0501 0.0426*
(0.0293) (0.0347) (0.0266) (0.0214)
0.0275 -0.0281 -0.0789 -0.0383
(0.0363) (0.0406) (0.0455) (0.0366)
-0.0333 -0.0447 -0.0991*** -0.0462*
(0.0255) (0.0315) (0.0262) (0.0211)
0.0097 0.0082 0.0207 0.0441
(0.0274) (0.0630) (0.0419) (0.0337)
-0.0510 -0.0639*** -0.0199 -0.0106
(0.0299) (0.0095) (0.0266) (0.0214)
-0.1011*** -0.1261** 0.2044*** 0.1626***
(0.0256) (0.0116) (0.0149) (0.0120)
-0.1888 -0.1844 -0.4054*** 0.1728*
(0.0993) (0.1237) (0.1003) (0.0808)
0.0357 0.0817 0.0108 -0.0417
(0.1053) (0.0767) (0.0433) (0.0349)
0.1811 0.1168* 0.0457 0.1882**
(0.1254) (0.0757) (0.1239) (0.0997)
0.7737*** 0.4525*** 0.1958*** 0.3419***
(0.0658) (0.0426) (0.0259) (0.0209)
-3.1928*** -1.8803*** 1.5155*** 0.9092***
(0.3324) (0.1664) (0.1216) (0.0979)
1.2445** 1.0892*** 0.2157 0.4642***
(0.4126) (0.6476) (0.1772) (0.1427)
-0.1215 0.4368*** 0.5589*** 0.4389***
(0.0648) (0.0246) (0.0641) (0.0516)
0.0294* 0.0162** -0.0113 -0.0108
(0.0113) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0066)
-0.0095 -0.0042* 0.0071 -0.0053






Similar to results for Title V funding and HSIs, patterns emerge when results are 
disaggregated based on race and ethnicity. Asian American and Pacific Islander, Black, 
and American Indian and Alaska Native are the primary targets of the majority of Title 
III-funded MSI programs. Yet as shown in Title V and HSI results, all racial and ethnic 
categories in institutions receiving Title III MSI funding had higher amounts of 






















In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0235*** -0.0451*** 0.0157*** -0.0028
(0.0044) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0017)
0.0454 0.0317 0.2078 0.1412
(0.1977) (0.1224) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-0.0854 -0.0930 -0.1285 -0.4617***
(0.1692) (0.1234) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-0.2797 0.6270* -1.2919*** -0.4129*
(0.4157) (0.1502) (0.2304) (0.1855)
-0.1284 -0.1662 0.1024 -0.0401
(0.2802) (0.1843) (0.1048) (0.1029)
-0.0326 0.0414 0.0191 0.0480
(0.0486) (0.0655) (0.0527) (0.0793)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
2.3486 -2.1758 13.2701*** 6.5587***
(4.5195) (2.2938) (2.4657) (1.9860)
693 1,390 1,016 1,016




Latino/a students appear to have benefitted from Title III MSI funded programs. 
As presented in Table 24, there was a six percent increase in Latino/a students obtaining 
bachelor’s degrees from private four-year MSIs. There was also a relationship between 
Title III MSI funding and Latino/a completion of community college credentials. This 






















Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all Latino/a 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.9801 0.0867* 0.0378* 0.0467***
(0.6688) (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0018)
-6.2699*** -6.336*** -7.9281* -4.1781***
(0.4025) (0.4451) (3.2423) (0.1589)
0.1039 0.9440 0.5662 0.0298
(0.0927) (0.8710) (0.3115) (0.0549)
-0.0156 -0.0656 0.0847 0.0508
(0.0247) (0.0448) (0.0581) (0.0163)
-0.0181 -0.0942 0.2179 -0.0651*
(0.0306) (0.0822) (0.0926) (0.0278)
-0.0247 -0.0489 0.0457 -0.0490**
(0.0215) (0.0653) (0.0468) (0.0160)
-0.0042 -0.0094 -0.0941 -0.0095
(0.0230) (0.0642) (0.0662) (0.0256)
-0.0939*** -0.1226*** -0.1731* -0.0412*
(0.0252) (0.0422) (0.0836) (0.0163)
-0.0561** -0.0161 0.4188*** 0.1102***
(0.0216) (0.0902) (0.1214) (0.0091)
-0.0886 -0.0611 0.0359 0.0603
(0.0837) (0.0743) (0.1609) (0.0614)
0.1728 0.0972 -0.0135 0.0332
(0.0887) (0.0475) (0.0710) (0.0265)
0.2168* 0.3021* -0.2009 -0.1578*
(0.1057) (0.2109) (0.1932) (0.0758)
0.8525*** 0.2864*** 0.1735*** 0.3023***
(0.0554) (0.0423) (0.0430) (0.0158)
-2.1803*** -1.8845*** 1.0202*** 0.5245***
(0.2801) (0.1620) (0.2858) (0.0744)
6.0892*** 5.8845*** 8.1877* 3.7719***
(0.3476) (0.9962) (3.2634) (0.1085)
-0.2368*** 0.5011*** 0.8197** 0.1047**
(0.0546) (0.0222) (0.2662) (0.0392)
0.0261** 0.0160** 0.0093 -0.0023
(0.0095) (0.0018) (0.0150) (0.0050)
-0.0142* -0.0101* -0.0169 -0.0113***






Increases in completion categories were highest for Asian American and Pacific 
Islander students in Title III MSIs. As displayed in Table 25, there was a five percent 
increase in bachelor’s degrees from public MSIs, a twelve percent increase in the 
attainment of private four-year bachelor’s degrees, a five percent increase in both 
























In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0251*** -0.0188*** 0.0186*** -0.0019
(0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0052) (0.0012)
-0.0217 -0.0421 -2.1398* -0.0189
(0.1666) (0.1812) (0.8497) (0.0906)
0.1193 0.9932 2.2170* -0.1502
(0.1425) (0.1876) (0.8845) (0.0906)
0.8270* 0.1256* -0.1887 0.1090
(0.3502) (0.5430) (0.4265) (0.1410)
-0.0793 -0.1092 0.0989 -0.0905
(0.0844) (0.1266) (0.1883) (0.1066)
-0.0322 0.0132 0.0244 0.0229
(0.0428) (0.0266) (0.0326) (0.0312)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
-15.7435*** -0.7417* -1.8694 -2.1367
(3.8078) (0.3420) (3.9291) (1.5095)
693 1,390 1,016 1,016





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all Asian American 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0472*** 0.0710* 0.0959*** 0.0245***
(0.0090) (0.0264) (0.0080) (0.0082)
-2.1931*** -2.1546** -0.6237*** -0.3323*
(0.5767) (0.7971) (0.1251) (0.1281)
0.3322* -0.3151* 0.1719*** 0.1705***
(0.1328) (0.1442) (0.0432) (0.0442)
0.0237 0.0199 0.0211 0.0305*
(0.0353) (0.0824) (0.0128) (0.0131)
-0.0269 0.1070* 0.0410 0.0219
(0.0438) (0.0503) (0.0219) (0.0224)
-0.0738* -0.0162 -0.0320* -0.0276*
(0.0308) (0.0236) (0.0126) (0.0129)
0.0307 0.0010 0.0118 0.0235
(0.0330) (0.0026) (0.0202) (0.0206)
-0.0751* 0.0009 -0.0456*** -0.0386**
(0.0361) (0.0062) (0.0128) (0.0131)
-0.0310 0.0003 0.1280*** 0.0648***
(0.0309) (0.0044) (0.0072) (0.0073)
-0.2907* 0.0932 -0.1656*** -0.0040
(0.1199) (0.2260) (0.0483) (0.0495)
0.2674* 0.4587 -0.0072 0.0364
(0.1271) (0.9880) (0.0209) (0.0214)
0.2517 0.4454 -0.0719 -0.1439*
(0.1514) (0.2685) (0.0597) (0.0611)
0.9063*** 0.4516*** 0.1229*** 0.1978***
(0.0795) (0.0754) (0.0125) (0.0128)
-2.2186*** 0.1245 0.4356*** 0.4010***
(0.4013) (0.3060) (0.0586) (0.0600)
1.6166*** -0.2284 0.1732* 0.2870***
(0.4981) (0.8999) (0.0854) (0.0874)
-0.4783*** -0.1660*** 0.0927** -0.0378
(0.0783) (0.0454) (0.0309) (0.0316)
0.0479*** 0.0100 0.0074 0.0090*
(0.0137) (0.0179) (0.0039) (0.0040)
-0.0130 -0.0152 -0.0014 -0.0039






Table 26 displays the results of American Indian and Alaska Native completion in 
Title III MSI institutions. While there was not evidence of an impact on baccalaureate 
degrees in either public or private MSIs, there was an increase in associate’s degrees 

























In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0237*** -0.0141*** 0.0033*** -0.0012
(0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0010) (0.0010)
-0.1231 0.4008 -0.3414*** -0.3002***
(0.2387) (3.7876) (0.0713) (0.0730)
0.0897 -0.3639 0.3211*** 0.2037**
(0.2042) (3.7840) (0.0714) (0.0730)
0.4826 1.2768* 0.3805*** 0.6891***
(0.5018) (0.5326) (0.1111) (0.1137)
-0.0799 -0.1098 0.0988 -0.0502
(0.0894) (0.1265) (0.1480) (0.1078)
-0.0999 0.0114 0.0110 0.0521
(0.0924) (0.0200) (0.0926)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
-10.8695* -17.1118** -4.8137*** -7.9332***
(5.4561) (6.0371) (1.1891) (1.2171)
693 1,390 1,016 1,016





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all American Indian 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























-0.7348 0.1364 0.0376*** 0.0674**
(0.0561) (1.4855) (0.0006) (0.0034)
0.2511 -0.0756 -0.9169*** -0.6002**
(0.0945) (0.2249) (0.2595) (0.2090)
0.2511** -0.0382 -0.1078 -0.1195
(0.0945) (0.0407) (0.0897) (0.0722)
-0.0193 0.0044 0.0501 0.0426*
(0.0251) (0.0124) (0.0266) (0.0214)
0.0708* -0.0017 -0.0789 -0.0383
(0.0312) (0.0141) (0.0455) (0.0366)
0.0007 -0.0193** -0.0991*** -0.0462*
(0.0219) (0.0066) (0.0262) (0.0211)
0.0160 0.0088 0.0207 -0.0441
(0.0235) (0.0092) (0.0419) (0.0337)
-0.1427*** 0.0155 -0.0199 -0.0106
(0.0257) (0.0189) (0.0266) (0.0214)
-0.0224 0.0042 0.2044*** 0.1626***
(0.0220) (0.0098) (0.0149) (0.0120)
-0.0368 0.0544 0.0401 0.1728*
(0.0853) (0.0637) (0.0236) (0.0808)
-0.0771 0.0455 0.0108 -0.0417
(0.0904) (0.0789) (0.0433) (0.0349)
0.0676 0.0224 0.0457 -0.2882**
(0.1078) (0.0757) (0.1239) (0.0997)
0.3743*** 0.2067*** 0.1958*** -0.0682***
(0.0565) (0.0212) (0.0259) (0.0190)
-0.6602* 0.3014*** 1.5155*** 0.9092***
(0.2855) (0.0863) (0.1216) (0.0979)
0.0740 -0.0622 0.2157 0.4642**
(0.3544) (0.2539) (0.1772) (0.1427)
-0.0803 0.0124 0.5589*** 0.4389***
(0.0557) (0.0128) (0.0641) (0.0516)
0.0204* -0.0001 -0.0113 -0.0108
(0.0097) (0.0050) (0.0082) (0.0066)
-0.0341*** -0.0152*** 0.0071 -0.0053






As more PBIs tend to be community colleges, it follows that increases in Black 
student completion occurred in two-year MSIs. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 27 present the 
results for associate’s degrees and certificates, with an increase of eight and four percent 
respectively. The largest increase was in private four-year baccalaureate degrees at eleven 
percent. There was not a statistically significant relationship between Title III MSI 























In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0143*** -0.0035** 0.0157*** -0.0028
(0.0038) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0017)
-0.2387 -5.7698*** 0.2078 0.1412
(0.1698) (1.0688) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-0.0255 5.7505*** -0.1285 -0.4617***
(0.1453) (1.0678) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-1.0889** -0.1221 -1.2919*** -0.4129*
(0.3571) (0.1503) (0.2304) (0.1855)
-0.0990 -0.1094 0.0665 -0.0452
(0.0721) (0.1269) (0.1460) (0.1072)
-0.0669 0.0450 0.0367 0.0511
(0.0800) (0.0998) (0.0615) (0.0427)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
12.0947** 0.4744 13.2701*** 6.5587***
(3.8824) (1.7036) (2.4657) (1.9860)
693 1,390 1,016 1,016





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all Black and African 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.9942 0.0737* 0.0376*** 3.6749
(0.7821) (0.0071) (0.0007) (1.3404)
3.1889*** 1.4461* -0.9169*** -0.6002**
(0.4706) (0.7174) (0.2595) (0.2090)
0.3275** -0.0315 -0.1078 -0.1195
(0.1084) (0.1298) (0.0897) (0.0722)
-0.0555 0.0610 0.0501 0.0426*
(0.0288) (0.0854) (0.0266) (0.0214)
-0.0088 0.1300** -0.0789 -0.0383
(0.0357) (0.0452) (0.0455) (0.0366)
0.0564* 0.0514* -0.0991*** -0.0462*
(0.0251) (0.0212) (0.0262) (0.0211)
-0.0147 0.0199 0.0207 -0.0441
(0.0270) (0.0146) (0.0419) (0.0337)
0.0841** 0.0022 -0.0199 -0.0106
(0.0294) (0.0032) (0.0266) (0.0214)
-0.0887*** 0.0061 0.2044*** 0.1626***
(0.0252) (0.0100) (0.0149) (0.0120)
-0.2039* -0.1107 -0.4054*** 0.1728*
(0.0978) (0.2034) (0.1003) (0.0808)
-0.0176 0.0201 0.0108 -0.0417
(0.1037) (0.0199) (0.0433) (0.0349)
0.1011 0.1999 0.0457 -0.2882*
(0.1236) (0.2416) (0.1239) (0.0997)
0.7682*** 0.5451*** 0.1958*** 0.3419***
(0.0648) (0.0678) (0.0259) (0.0209)
-2.2488*** 0.3195 1.5155*** 0.9092***
(0.3275) (0.2754) (0.1216) (0.0979)
0.6499 -0.6409 0.2157 0.4642***
(0.4065) (0.8099) (0.1772) (0.1427)
0.2602*** -0.0457 0.5589*** 0.4389***
(0.0639) (0.0409) (0.0641) (0.0516)
0.0488*** -0.0130 -0.0113 -0.0108
(0.0112) (0.0161) (0.0082) (0.0066)
0.0258** 0.0208* 0.0071 -0.0053






Though MSI programs focus on advancing success for students of color, White 
students also benefit from such programs. In Title III MSIs, White students increased 
completion of credentials and degrees in all categories. Table 28 displays these results. 
White student completion was highest in private four-year institutions (ten percent) and 
























In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0365*** -0.0116** 0.0157*** -0.0028
(0.0043) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0017)
-0.0783 4.6229 0.2078 0.1412
(0.1948) (3.4088) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-0.2885 -4.6105 -0.1285 -0.4617***
(0.1667) (3.4056) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-1.0622* -0.6729 -1.2919*** -0.4129*
(0.4095) (0.4793) (0.2304) (0.1855)
-0.1200 -0.1281 0.1188 -0.0702
(0.1291) (0.1266) (0.1989) (0.0991)
-0.0758 0.0822 0.0252 0.0528
(0.0743) (0.0942) (0.0506) (0.0504)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
10.8533* 4.7016 13.2701*** 6.5587***
(4.4527) (5.4334) (2.4657) (1.9860)
693 1,390 1,016 1,016





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all White, non-





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0862* 0.0988* 0.0376*** 0.0674**
(0.0189) (0.0438) (0.0006) (0.0034)
-2.4737*** -2.1782*** -0.9169*** -0.6002**
(0.5168) (0.6720) (0.2595) (0.2090)
0.2452* -0.0428 -0.1078 -0.1195
(0.1190) (0.1216) (0.0897) (0.0722)
0.0196 0.0100 0.0501 0.0426*
(0.0317) (0.0221) (0.0266) (0.0214)
-0.0108 0.0696 -0.0789 -0.0383
(0.0393) (0.0424) (0.0455) (0.0366)
-0.0585* 0.0262 -0.0991*** -0.0462*
(0.0276) (0.0199) (0.0262) (0.0211)
0.0234 0.0099 0.0207 -0.0441
(0.0296) (0.0126) (0.0419) (0.0337)
-0.0748* 0.0126 -0.0199 -0.0106
(0.0323) (0.0299) (0.0266) (0.0214)
-0.0900*** 0.1012 0.2044*** 0.1626***
(0.0277) (0.1089) (0.0149) (0.0120)
-0.2969** -0.1440 -0.4054*** 0.1728*
(0.1074) (0.1905) (0.1003) (0.0808)
-0.0001 0.0202 0.0108 -0.0417
(0.1139) (0.0444) (0.0433) (0.0349)
0.2750* 0.3437 0.0457 -0.2882**
(0.1357) (0.2263) (0.1239) (0.0997)
0.7025*** 0.7078*** 0.1958*** 0.3419***
(0.0712) (0.0635) (0.0259) (0.0209)
-3.4019*** 0.5336* 1.5155*** 0.9092***
(0.3597) (0.2580) (0.1216) (0.0979)
-1.4232*** -3.4673*** 0.2157 0.4642***
(0.4464) (0.7587) (0.1772) (0.1427)
-0.1043 -0.0252 0.5589*** 0.4389***
(0.0702) (0.0383) (0.0641) (0.0516)
0.0300* 0.0044 -0.0113 -0.0108
(0.0123) (0.0151) (0.0082) (0.0066)
-0.0008 -0.0073 0.0071 -0.0053






As seen in the results for Title V funding and HSIs, there was also a relationship 
between Title III MSI funding and completion measures for non-resident alien students. 
The rate of change was mostly lower than other racial and ethnic categories. For example, 
non-resident alien students saw an increase of two percent in public four-year bachelor’s 
degrees for Title III-funding MSIs as seen in Table 29. Columns 4 and 5 show that these 
students experienced an increase of one percent in both associate’s degrees and 






















In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0255*** -0.0069* 0.0157*** -0.0028
(0.0048) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0017)
0.0036 -2.6966 0.2078 0.1412
(0.2139) (3.1931) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-0.1395 2.8723 -0.1285 -0.4617***
(0.1830) (3.1901) (0.1480) (0.1192)
-0.7919 -0.7943 -1.2919*** -0.4129*
(0.4498) (0.4490) (0.2304) (0.1855)
-0.0978 -0.1192 0.0884 -0.0992
(0.0614) (0.1263) (0.1882) (0.1144)
-0.0120 0.0204 0.0141 0.0483
(0.0369) (0.0888) (0.0495) (0.0717)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
9.4948 5.1324 13.2701 6.5587***
(4.8899) (5.0896) (2.4657) (1.9860)
693 1,390 1,016 1,016





Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title III on all Non-resident 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time enrollment
Percent of part-time students
























0.0812* 4.0838 0.0664* 0.0127**
(0.0235) (3.0857) (0.0047) (0.0040)
-1.1679* -1.0151* -0.1020 -0.1664**
(0.5010) (0.4672) (0.0734) (0.0627)
0.3969*** -0.3679*** 0.0891*** 0.1225***
(0.1154) (0.0845) (0.0253) (0.0216)
0.0234 0.0015 0.0035 0.0076
(0.0307) (0.0062) (0.0075) (0.0064)
0.0718 0.0532 0.0419*** 0.0378***
(0.0381) (0.0294) (0.0128) (0.0109)
-0.0095 -0.0132 -0.0046 -0.0209***
(0.0268) (0.0138) (0.0074) (0.0063)
0.0327 0.0441 -0.0248* 0.0039
(0.0287) (0.0587) (0.0118) (0.0101)
-0.0166 -0.0960 -0.0169* -0.0368***
(0.0313) (0.1055) (0.0075) (0.0064)
0.0194 0.0194 0.0748*** 0.0336***
(0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0042) (0.0036)
-0.2657* 0.2361 -0.0710* -0.0094
(0.1041) (0.1325) (0.0283) (0.0057)
0.0332 0.0062 0.0057 0.0169
(0.1104) (0.0126) (0.0122) (0.0104)
0.0863 0.3527* -0.0939** -0.1001***
(0.1316) (0.1573) (0.0350) (0.0299)
0.7851*** 0.5253*** 0.0573*** 0.0507***
(0.0690) (0.0442) (0.0073) (0.0062)
-2.6539*** -0.3918* 0.1733*** 0.1303***
(0.3486) (0.1793) (0.0344) (0.0293)
0.8433 -0.1249 0.0024 0.0661
(0.4327) (0.5275) (0.0501) (0.0428)
-0.2733*** -0.1466*** 0.0903*** -0.0052
(0.0680) (0.0266) (0.0181) (0.0154)
0.0430*** 0.0018 0.0009 0.0034
(0.0119) (0.0105) (0.0023) (0.0019)
-0.0032 0.0008 0.0001 0.0007






Title V: Upward Social Mobility 
 
Based on recent studies assessing upward social mobility across institutional 
sectors (Chetty et al., 2017), it would be assumed that public institutions might 
demonstrate a higher propensity for graduating students of color. Chetty et al. (2017) 
created rankings for upward social mobility. One rankings list featured eight MSIs out of 
ten institutions or systems that boost the highest number of students from the lowest 






















In-state Tuition and Fees











Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-0.0275*** -0.0079*** 0.0035*** -0.0002
(0.0046) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0005)
0.0022 2.5831 -0.0802 -0.1375***
(0.2073) (2.2201) (0.0418) (0.0357)
-0.2798 -2.5413 0.0656 0.1243***
(0.1774) (2.2180) (0.0418) (0.0357)
-0.9159* 0.4714 0.3535*** 0.0002
(0.4360) (0.3122) (0.0651) (0.0556)
-0.0794 -0.1091 0.0983 -0.0501
(0.0812) (0.1266) (0.1480) (0.1072)
-0.0811 0.0752 0.0411 0.0722
(0.0962) (0.0653) (0.0718) (0.0838)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
7.5770 -8.7078* -4.1110*** -0.2988
(4.7400) (3.5387) (0.6977) (0.5960)
693 1,390 1,016 1,016




conducting a quasi-experimental research design employing the Equality of Opportunity 
Project data. Though Chetty et al. (2017) found that many public four-year institutions 
advanced upward social mobility, others did not. As these researchers found, there is 
usually an inverse relationship between institutional selectivity and upward social 
mobility.  
There was evidence of a relationship between Title V funding and upward social 
mobility in all categories of upward social mobility. These results are shown in tables 30-
33. As presented in Table 30, there was a five percent increase in students rising two 
economic quintiles when controlling for all other factors in public four-year HSIs. There 
was a three percent increase in students rising two economic quintiles in two-year HSIs, 















Table 30:  
 
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on upward social 












1 to 5, 
Public four 
year
1 to 5, 
Private 
four year
1 to 5, 
Public two 
year
HSI/Treatment 0.0483* 0.0436 0.0339 0.0308*** 0.0399*** 0.0206***
(0.0237) (0.0301) (0.0197) (0.0061) (0.0079) (0.0046)
Latino/a Enrollment 0.0321 0.0211 0.0513 -0.0140 -0.0295** -0.0037
(0.0347) (0.0196) (0.0304) (0.0089) (0.0111) -(0.0037)
Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees -0.0010 0.0165 -0.0046 0.0018* 0.0001 0.0006
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Federal Operating Grants 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Other Federal Operating Grants -0.0007 0.0028** -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
State Operating Grants 0.0016* 0.0001 0.0008 0.0005** -0.0004*** 0.0003**
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Federal Appropriations 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
State Appropriations 0.0021* 0.0012 0.0010 0.0007** 0.0002 0.0004*
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Local Appropriations -0.0022*** -0.0006 -0.0018*** -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0003***
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Instructional Expenses -0.0101*** -0.0033 -0.0102*** -0.0022*** 0.0029* -0.0021***
(0.0024) (0.0045) (0.0025) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0006)
Academic Support -0.0079*** -0.0090*** -0.0065*** -0.0018*** -0.0014*** -0.0012***
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Total Operating Revenues -0.0031 -0.0235*** 0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0035*** 0.0006
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Instutional Enrollment
Total full-time, first time 
enrollment -0.0113*** -0.0071*** -0.0136*** 0.0005 0.0007* 0.0001
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0045)
Percent of part-time students -0.0020 -0.0008 -0.0064 -0.009*** -0.0122*** -0.0091***
(0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0057) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Percent of students of color 0.1658*** 0.1670*** 0.1435 0.0276*** 0.0260*** 0.0225***
(0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Student Financial Aid
Pell Grants 0.0265*** 0.0106*** 0.0240*** 0.0024*** 0.0010*** 0.0021***
(0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
State Need-Based Aid -0.0008 -0.0010* -0.0011* 0.0002 0.0003* 0.0001
-(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
State Merit-Based Aid -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0015***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0031) (0.0001)
Institutional Characteristics
Selectivity 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0002* .0010*** 0.0001 0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0077)
In-state Tuition and Fees 0.0172*** 0.0088** 0.0141*** 0.0020** 0.0013 0.0019***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees -0.0153*** -0.0059* -0.0120*** -0.0018* -0.0012 -0.0014**









The greatest distance in upward mobility as measured by Chetty et al. (2017) is 
rising from the lowest income quintile to the highest. There is a relationship between 
Title V HSI funding and increasing from lowest to highest income quintiles in all sectors. 
As seen in Table 31, there was a three percent increase in public four-year HSIs, a four 
percent increase in private four-year HSIs, and a two percent increase in HSI community 
colleges. This provides an empirical reinforcement to Chetty et al.’s (2017) ranking of 
















1 to 5, 
Public four 
year
1 to 5, 
Private 
four year




Per capita Income 0.0154 -0.0073 0.0014 0.0174*** 0.0152*** 0.0103***
(0.0154) (0.0078) (0.0071) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0016)
State unemployment rate -0.0112 0.0090 -0.0028 -0.0521 -0.1091 0.0983
(0.0277) (0.0422) (0.0773) (0.0697) (0.1266) (0.1480)
Percent of state age 25 or older 
with bachelor's degree 0.0501 0.0222 0.0664 -0.0301 0.0752 0.0411
(0.0721) (0.0678) (0.1010) (0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0718)
Constant 0.0709 0.2965 0.2554*** -0.1890*** -0.1715*** -0.1033***
(0.0874) (0.0886) (0.0755) (0.0226) (0.0234) (0.0180)
Observations 2519 2894 2805 2519 2894 2805
R-squared 0.5296 0.4788 0.4867 0.2783 0.098 0.2747




Table 31:  
 
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on upward social 






Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time 
enrollment
Percent of part-time students







In-state Tuition and Fees
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees
1 to 4, 
Public four 
year
1 to 4, 
Private 
four year
1 to 4, 
Public two 
year
1 to 3, 
Public four 
year
1 to 3, 
Private 
four year
1 to 3, 
Public two 
year
.0224*** 0.0247*** 0.0188** 0.0298*** 0.0522*** 0.0299***
(0.0056) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0110) (0.0068)
.0630*** 0.0613*** 0.0557*** 0.0471*** 0.0720*** 0.0465***
(0.0082) (0.0100) (0.0091) (0.0113) (0.0154) (0.0105)
-0.0012 0.0044*** -0.0009 -0.0092*** 0.0039*** -0.0088***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009)
0.0004* 0.0005* 0.0008* 0.0007** 0.0004** 0.0009***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0009)
-0.0001 0.0004* 0.0006 0.0001 0.0012*** 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0026) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0003* 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0007*** -0.0002 -0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0001 0.0011 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.0027) (0.0012) (0.0018)
-0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0008
(0.0002) (0.0009) -(0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0027)
-0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0011)
-0.0016** -0.0055*** -0.0014* -0.0011 -0.0043** -0.0017
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0008)
-0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 0.0008
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
-0.0031*** -0.0014 -0.0032*** 0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0011)
-0.0038*** -0.0024*** -0.0036*** -0.0072*** -0.0011*** -0.0085***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
0.0042** 0.0081*** 0.0056*** 0.0102*** 0.0214*** 0.0126***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0020)
0.0381*** 0.0396*** 0.0370*** 0.0530*** 0.0617 0.0556***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019)
0.0087*** 0.0019*** 0.0081*** 0.0126*** 0.0014*** 0.0144***
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0144)
-0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0003 -0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
0.0003 0.0009 0.0009 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0042) (0.0088) (0.0032) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
.0006** 0.0021*** 0.0011*** 0.0017 0.0015*** 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.0048)
0.0030*** 0.0004 0.0022** 0.0026** -0.0003 .0018*
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008)
-0.0025*** 0.0001 -0.0020** -0.0041*** -0.0001 -0.0029***









Several other categories of mobility as measured by income quintile distance 
demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between Title V funding and upward 
mobility. First to third quintile, second to fifth, and third to fifth demonstrated a 
statistically significant relationship in all sectors. As show in Tables 31-33, increases 
ranged form two to five percent. For example, there was an increase of three percent in 
those rising from second to fifth in four-year public HSIs and five percent in four-year 
private HSIs. Third to fifth also displayed similar levels of increases in all sectors, as 
shown in Table 33: four percent in public four-year and three percent in both private 
four-year HSIs and two-year HSIs. The second to fourth category was the only one to 
feature no statistically significant relationship between Title V HSI funding and upward 





1 to 4, 
Public four 
year
1 to 4, 
Private 
four year
1 to 4, 
Public two 
year
1 to 3, 
Public four 
year
1 to 3, 
Private 
four year











*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001.
-0.0079*** -0.0139*** -0.0083*** -0.0217*** -0.0328*** -0.0176***
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0024)
0.0032 -0.0462 -0.1266 -0.0702 -0.0978 -0.1200
(0.0010) (0.0511) (0.1410) (0.0991) (0.0614) (0.1291)
0.0981 -0.0669 0.0667 0.0528 -0.0120 -0.0758
(0.1212) (0.0800) (0.0895) (0.0504) (0.0369) (0.0743)
0.1493 0.2054*** 0.1499*** 0.327*** 0.4462*** 0.2951***
(0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0223) (0.0286) (0.0324) (0.0262)
2519 2894 2805 2519 2894 2805




Table 32:  
 
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on upward social 





Institutional Finance (per $1,000)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Operating Grants









Total full-time, first time 
enrollment
Percent of part-time students







In-state Tuition and Fees
Out-of-state Tuition and Fees
2 to 4, 
Public four 
year
2 to 4, 
Private 
four year
2 to 4, 
Public two 
year
2 to 5, 
Public four 
year
2 to 5, 
Private 
four year
2 to 5, 
Public two 
year
-0.0002 -0.0001 0.0050 0.0339*** 0.0453*** 0.0259***
(0.0064) (0.0080) (0.0054) (0.0072) (0.0096) (0.0057)
0.0104 0.0095 0.0051 -0.02878** -0.0461*** -0.0188*
(0.0095) (0.0113) (0.0055) (0.0105) (0.0135) (0.0087)
0.0027** 0.0053*** 0.0031*** 0.0105** 0.0008 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007)
-0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
0.0007*** 0.0003* 0.0004** 0.0005* 0.0005 0.0003*
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0002)
-0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007* 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0022) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
-0.0005*** -0.0002 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0001 -0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0014* -0.0083*** -0.0017* -0.0016* 0.0032* -0.0015*
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0007)
-0.0010* -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0026*** -0.0012 -0.0022***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0004)
-0.0053*** -0.0014 -0.0038*** 0.0009 -0.0048*** 0.0032***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010)
-0.0049*** -0.0034*** -0.0047 0.0011** 0.0014*** 0.0010*
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
0.0113*** 0.0119*** 0.0102*** -0.0091*** -0.0141*** -0.0118***
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0017)
0.0319*** 0.0300*** 0.0251*** 0.0226*** 0.0203*** 0.0164***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017)
0.0071*** 0.0042*** 0.0052*** -0.0002 0.0013*** -0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
-0.0003* -0.0004** -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0005* 0.0003 0.0010* .0005* -0.0003 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0040) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0024)
0.0003* 0.0028*** 0.0017** 0.0034*** 0.0028** 0.0031***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007)
-0.0023** -0.0018* -0.0015* -0.0027** -0.0022* -0.0023***




































2 to 4, 
Public four 
year
2 to 4, 
Private 
four year
2 to 4, 
Public two 
year
2 to 5, 
Public four 
year
2 to 5, 
Private 
four year











*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001.
-0.0108*** -0.0128*** -0.0098*** 0.0209*** 0.0201*** 0.0132***
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0020)
0.1188 -0.1182 -0.0112 -0.0089 0.0843 -0.0428
(0.1989) (0.1244) (0.0216) (0.0456) (0.1243) (0.0894)
0.0252 -0.0212 -0.0226 0.0123 0.0098 0.0287
(0.0506) (0.0388) (0.0444) (0.0278) (0.0142) (0.0639)
0.1785*** 0.1946*** 0.1689*** -0.2164*** -0.2121*** -0.1266***
(0.0238) (0.0236) (0.0210) (0.0266) (0.0282) (0.0217)
2519 2,894 2805 2519 2894 2805




Table 33:  
 
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on upward social 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study finds evidence of a causal link between an institution receiving funding 
as an MSI and increasing college completion measures. It also demonstrates a causal 
relationship between Title V funding and upward social mobility in HSIs. These findings 
are modest in the magnitude of impact. While this study can answer these quantitative 
questions, it cannot answer the qualitative questions related to why MSIs appear to 
advance college completion and upward mobility. This study cannot delve deeper than 
whether or not an institution receives Title V or Title III funding. It does not explore how 
that funding is used. That is an area of study critical to better understanding how MSIs 
are performing this important function.  
Most would argue that the common goal of college is to graduate students. For at 
least the past decade, college completion has become a priority in public policy for higher 
education in addition to popular media accounts of higher education (Perna & Finney, 
2014; Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, & Finney, 2012). Considering the ongoing public 
narrative that emphasizes college completion, it is not a surprise that MSIs tend to 
include degree attainment and student retention as primary outcomes for their federally 
funded programs. Advocacy organizations continue to push for policymakers to 
emphasize the importance of increasing the number of postsecondary certificate or degree 
holders. Extensive research has demonstrated how this has influenced policymakers 
throughout the U.S. at both the state and federal levels (McLendon, Hearn and Mokher, 
2009; Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). A popular state finance approach to incentivizing 




(Dougherty & Natow, 2015). Empirical research mostly finds a null or negative impact of 
pay-for-performance as it has thus far been implemented towards higher education 
(Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016). Yet MSIs are especially vulnerable to such accountability 
policies that tend to penalize institutions enrolling a larger share of academically 
underprepared and lower-income students (Boland, 2015; Jones, 2014; Jones, 2016). 
Given the current context of prioritized college completion and increased tenor of 
accountability, it stands to reason MSIs will continue to focus on completion and 
retention in all sectors and levels of higher education. 72 percent of all Title V and Title 
III project abstracts suggest measures of college completion (associate’s and bachelor’s 
degrees or graduation rates) as programmatic goals (Boland, 2018).  
A critical consideration when assessing the efficacy of public policies related to 
higher education degree attainment and upward social mobility is how well such policies 
further equity. As explored in Chapter 2, the research into the relationship between public 
policies and higher education completion measures varies wildly in terms of empirical 
findings. Many argue that most public policies for postsecondary education lead to 
unintended consequences that negatively affect students, such as the complex array of 
federal financial aid programs. While the research on these forms of aid are mixed in how 
they affect student success, this study finds evidence of a positive relationship between 
federal grants to institutions with the purpose of assisting students of color. It also finds 
that these institutions benefit all students in some measures, including White students. In 




Though most MSIs highlight measurable outcomes such as graduation rates and 
workforce training, many also emphasize not as easily quantifiable goals including 
community and culture. These have been hallmarks of MSIs and are often seen as the 
secret to how these institutions have been able to graduate a higher number of students of 
color. Infusing programs that prioritize student success through connections to 
community and incorporation of culture can lead towards increased quantifiable 
outcomes. MSIs prioritize student outcomes through programs that give primacy to 
student backgrounds. They also address local economic needs through curriculum 
focused on STEM, teacher education, and healthcare employment. 
While MSIs share many similarities across category and sector in how they use 
their federal grant, there are notable and expected differences. This occurs mostly 
between sector and level, with exceptions. We would expect community college MSIs to 
focus on local workforce needs. PBIs largely reflect this. Building bridges to local high 
schools and community organizations is another reoccurring element in MSI two-year 
institutions. Yet the community focus also appears in four-year public schools, such as 
the University of Illinois, Chicago. It becomes clear through the project abstracts that 
most MSIs recognize they are institutions existing within communities that benefit from 
the college as much as the institution benefits from the community (Boland, 2018).  
Title V funding leads to increase in college completion 
 
 For each college completion variable in every sector of higher education included 
in this study, institutions produced increases after receiving Title V funding as HSIs. This 




assessing the total enrollment, Title V funding appears to have a statistically significant 
impact on associate’s degrees and bachelor’s degrees in private non-profit four-year 
HSIs. It is possible that MSI-funded programs and services generally target students of 
color. This would in part explain why the institution as a whole does not lead to increases 
in completion in all higher education sectors. That this study finds a relationship between 
this category of outcomes and HSI federal funding at all could indicate that benefits 
accrue to the entire institution and not just students of color.  
 The majority of Title V funding appears to be used to benefit Latino/a students. 
The results of this study wherein the outcome variables are disaggregated by Latino/a 
students seems to confirm that such an approach is successful. Increases were higher in 
both public and private four-year HSIs, with as much as a 12 percent increase in 
bachelor’s degrees at the latter. Latino/a students showed an increase in all categories. 
This finding aligns with previous research into how HSIs serve their student populations 
(Nuñez and Elizondo, 2013). It suggests that such approaches to student success are 
effective, at least amongst this study’s sample.  
 Another finding that demands more evaluation is increases in student completion 
amongst other racial and ethnic groups. Asian American and Pacific Islander students in 
particular benefitted within HSIs. This could be a function of this student population 
comprising a large share of full-time enrollment in many HSIs, particularly those located 
in California and New York. It is also plausible that Asian American and Pacific Islander 




 Amongst other racial and ethnic groups, Title V funding appeared to have some 
impact on Black and American Indian and Alaska Native students. Both tend to 
experience lower graduation rates in comparison to other racial and ethnic categories. 
While increases were relatively small, more research into the role that HSIs serve these 
students is vital in understanding the mechanism by which they benefit in terms of 
college completion.  
 The non-resident alien race/ethnic category as defined by IPEDS refers to 
numerous student populations. Other researchers have noted higher populations of 
immigrant students in HSIs, particularly along the border with Mexico in states such as 
Texas (Boland, 2017; Creusere, Fernandez, Fletcher, & Rice (2014).  Several argue that 
HSIs have excelled in serving such immigrant students (Boland, 2017; Excelencia in 
Education, 2015; Fletcher & Webster, n.d.; Santiago, 2011). While this study cannot 
isolate the specific populations within the non-resident alien classification, it is possible 
that those completing at higher rates in HSIs are Latino/a immigrants. The high upward 
mobility rate found for community colleges including HSIs Glendale Community College 
would reflect this study’s finding that there was a 9 percent increase in these students 
completing with a community college certificate. 
 El Paso Community College (EPCC) has distinguished itself for committing to 
student success. It has created numerous programs to improve course completion and 
facilitate transfer to a four-year institution. These include The College Readiness 
Initiative, the Pretesting Retesting Educational Program, Early College High Schools, and 




transfer agreement with the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). The “2+2 Degree 
Plan” allows students who have transferred to fulfill the requirements of their associate 
degree while completing the requirements for their bachelor’s degree. Since both 
institutions formalized the program in 1996, reverse transfer students have earned 2,874 
associate degrees and almost 2,000 bachelor’s degrees (U.S. Department of Education, 
2015).  
Another example of how HSIs advance student success is Dodge City Community 
College in Dodge City, KS.  This two-year HSI represents a comprehensive approach to 
increasing the number of certificate or degree completers. Their program, Connecting to 
Success, seeks to improve student success measures by targeting the root causes of low 
performance in those areas. The school employs a combination of services to increase the 
number of students obtaining a certificate or degree or transferring to a four-year school. 
These include academic tracking systems, additional advising for ESL students, and 
flipped classroom online and in-class activities (Boland, 2018).    
Title III funding led to increase in college completion 
 
Some caution is warranted when interpreting the results of the Title III analysis, 
as this includes several different categories of MSIs. This study acknowledges the 
heterogeneity of these institutions. Though they share a mission of serving traditionally 
underserved student populations, those particular student populations vary. These 
institutions likewise vary in their approach to using their Title III funding as MSIs. 
Common threads weave these institutions together, which provides some justification for 




approach to Title III should allow for the statistical control of the heterogeneity between 
these types of MSIs and across sectors. Yet it is clear that these individual institutions 
serve students in various ways that could defy quantitative analysis. 
 The impact of Title III MSI funding for all students in the aggregate was more 
pronounced in community colleges. In particular, there was an increase eight percent in 
associate’s degrees amongst the entire full-time student population. This could suggest 
that Title III two-year MSIs focus their federal funding on functions that relate to the 
entire school, such as technological innovation or distance education programs.  
 Throughout the racial and ethnic categories primarily served by Title III funding, 
much of the increases in completion measures occurred at the community college level. 
This could in part reflect the fact that many Title III MSI recipients are community 
colleges.  
 Though community colleges accounted for many of the increases in completion 
by race and ethnicity in relation to Title III, private four-year MSIs receiving Title III 
funding produced sizable increase in baccalaureate degree attainment. For example, there 
was an increase of 12 percent amongst Asian American and Pacific Islander students 
receiving bachelor’s degrees. California and New York include most of the AANAPISIs 
in the U.S. Of this number, approximately half are smaller private, non-profit four-year 
institutions.  
According to the U.S. Census, the Asian American and Pacific Islander 
population is predicted to increase to 40 million by 2050 (White House Initiative on 




college enrollment is anticipated to increase by 35 percent over the next decade. There 
are approximately 1.2 million students attending AANAPISIs across the U.S. (APIACU, 
2014). There are currently over 150 AANAPISIs in the U.S., representing 48 ethnicities 
and over 300 different languages (White House Initiative on Asian American and Pacific 
Islanders, 2014). Unlike most HSIs, many AANAPISIs do not realize they are an 
AANAPISI and are eligible for federal funding. Of the 150 eligible AANAPISIs, 78 
applied for federal designation. Of those institutions, 14 percent received federal grants 
(CARE, 2012). Similar to many HSIs, an important role of AANAPISIs is serving 
immigrant students. Asian American and Pacific Islander students enrolled in 
AANAPISIs are more likely to be non-English speakers and immigrants (CARE, 2012). 
This is captured in this study’s results. While increases were lower than other racial and 
ethnic populations, non-resident alien students increased between 1 and 2 percent in both 
public bachelor’s degrees, associate’s degrees, and community college certificates. 
Despite the current political tenor amongst federal lawmakers against certain populations 
of immigrants, significant growth in Asian American and Pacific Islander and Latino/a 
peoples will continue. This study provides potential evidence that MSIs provide a 
measurable benefit to these students.   
An example of an AANAPISI program at a community college is at Evergreen 
Valley College in San Jose, CA. It proposed its Southeast Asian American Student 
Excellence (SEAASE) program to advance participation and completion amongst 
Vietnamese and other Asian American and Pacific Islander students. It lists amongst 




per year, boosting the retention rate from 62.9 percent to 75 percent, and increasing 
completion with the goal of 70 percent of Southeast Asian American students earning 40 
credits, a certificate, or transferring to a four-year institution within two years of 
beginning the program. 
While this study does not explore transfer, it remains a critical function for 
college completion. A specific MSI transfer program efforts is a cooperative grant 
between two ANNH institutions, the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa and the University 
of Hawai’i Maui College, titled Kekaulike (“to share equally, equality, equity, justice, 
mutual, to equalize, balance”). Amongst several goals, the program seeks to construct a 
“transfer bridge” between the two schools. To further this effort, the program also 
proposes providing additional academic support to those students interested in 
transferring (Boland, 2018).   
 As with many HSI programs, Title III MSI programs prioritize a holistic approach 
to student success. For example, the University of Alaska Southeast, Sitka Campus 
proposed a all-encompassing approach to fostering student success entitled “Complete to 
Compete: A Holistic Approach to Student Success for Alaska Native and High-Need 
Students.” With “five goals and 28 measurable, realistic objectives drawn from locally-
based needs assessment and strategic planning, a research-based logic model, and a 
strong external evaluation,” the program seeks to prioritize student success while 
fostering a sense of “community and institutional identity” (Boland, 2018). 
Another method MSIs use to support students is the development of a center to 




two-year PBI in Augusta, GA, created the Center for Learning and Academic Support 
Services  (CLASS). This center emphasizes the improvement of math and writing 
amongst students with the goal of increasing the school’s retention rate as well as its 
graduation rate (Boland, 2018). 
Another approach to advancing student success is pre-college outreach programs. 
The University of Minnesota, Morris uses summer bridge programs to increase access to 
their institution. Through the program “Morris Native American Student Success 
(NASS),” the four-year public NASNTI focuses in advancing the degree attainment of its 
Native American students. Chief amongst this effort is the expansion of the school’s 
summer bridge program to ease transition to college through academic advising and peer 
mentors. 
Title V leads to increase upward social mobility 
 
 The various project mechanisms and outcomes explored in this study connect to a 
broader product of students enrolling in and graduating from MSIs. As other researchers 
demonstrate, MSIs appear to be engines of upward social mobility. In their recent work 
on mobility in higher education, Chetty et al. include eight MSIs in their top ten colleges 
that showed substantial improvement in the social mobility of students of color and low-
income students. In exploring the Chetty et al. study, Hillman (2017) examined the social 
mobility rates of institutions in the California State University system. The majority of 
these campuses are MSIs. Nearly half of students in some schools within the CSU system 
were found to rise in social mobility. Next to California, Texas is the state with the most 




those in California (Boland, 2017). This applied to both two and four-year MSIs in the 
state.  
Clearly, California and Texas are key HSI states. Over 60 percent of Californian 
Latino college students attend an HSI. The state’s HSIs also account for more than half of 
all higher education institutions in California. Given the size of the community college 
system, it should not be a surprise that nearly 80 percent of Latino students are enrolled 
in an HSI community college (Malcom-Piqueux, et. al., 2013). The growth of HSIs has 
occurred mostly due to their proximity to predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. 
Low tuition also makes HSIs an attractive means of obtaining a college education. Thus, 
Latino students tend to enroll mostly in HSIs near their homes (Hispanic Association of 
Colleges & Universities, 2014). 
 Though they comprise some state flagship institutions (especially in California 
and Texas), the majority of HSIs are community colleges and less selective public four-
year institutions. These are largely the workhorses of U.S. higher education. Broad access 
institutions (defined as those admitting more than 90 percent of those who apply) account 
for more than half of all postsecondary institutions in the U.S. As Chetty et al. (2017) 
found, many of these HSIs perform the function of providing an avenue for upward 
mobility for students of color.   
 As noted in the methods and results sections, data limitations restrict a proper 
analysis of exploring a potential causal relationship between Title III and upward 
mobility. Exploratory results indicate some potential for AANAPISIs to lead to an 




relationship between Title III funding for MSIs and upward mobility. While college 
completion measures such as bachelor’s and associate’s degrees do not neatly align with 
mobility, the results from this study demonstrating a relationship between Title V and 
both completion and mobility could suggest such a relationship between Title III and 
those outcomes.  
Contributions of this study 
 
 This study contributes to the research literature on MSIs, student success, and 
specific policies of the Higher Education Act by using an empirical research design to 
explore the relationship between assorted measures of student success and federal public 
policy interventions. This is the first study that the author is aware of to use a regression 
discontinuity design to estimate the relationship between Title V and Title III MSI 
policies and college completion and upward mobility outcomes across multiple MSI 
categories nationwide. The results of this study suggest that Title V and Title III do lead 
to increases in college completion outcomes. The results also indicate that Title V causes 
an increase in upward social mobility across different mobility measures. This study 
raises many more questions that demand future exploration.  
Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
 
It is impossible to predict the shape of federal funding for MSIs to come. Funding 
levels have not decreased significantly for any Title III or Title V category. Yet funding 
levels have also not increased significantly. While MSIs should continue to apply for 
competitive grants and eligible MSIs should especially apply, it is unrealistic to expect a 




aimed specifically at recipients of Title III and Title V funding would have a substantial 
impact on all U.S. MSIs. Yet an important lesson can be learned through a closer 
inspection of the evolution of federal legislation for MSIs. This evolution partly explains 
why each category of MSI is funded at different levels. The disparity in MSI funding per 
MSI classification is likely revealed through the politics of policymaking. HBCUs 
received federal policy recognition with the Higher Education Act of 1965. This resulted 
from decades of work on the parts of many fighting for this goal. HSIs grew from similar 
political struggle, as noted above. AANAPISIs and other MSI categories also found 
recognition, but only after political outreach. This topic demands additional research. Yet 
it appears that those institutions that form coalitions and form alliances with politicians 
stand a much better chance of receiving more federal funding. 
It is critical for MSIs to forge alliances with state and federal policymakers. 
Numerous studies demonstrate the impact of policymaker influence on public policy for 
higher education (Ness, 2010; Tandberg & Griffith, 2013). MSI administrators should 
strive to boost their political capital by investing in outreach to politicians working within 
their respective districts. HBCUs and HSIs have excelled at developing relationships with 
politicians who have supported and advocated for these institutions at all political levels 
(Macdonald, Botti, & Clark, 2007). As the evolution of HBCUs and HSIs reveals, 
creating coalitions amongst institutions has been a critical step in advancing their causes 
(Boland, Gasman, Nguyen, & Castro Samayoa, 2015). Neither would have persevered 
had they not aligned with one another first and then sought to win influence within the 




Another recommendation for institutions applying for a competitive MSI grant is 
to develop specific targets and explicit outcomes for their proposed MSI programs. The 
Department of Education does not offer information on how many of the project abstracts 
received funding for their institutions. The number of awards per year indicates that most 
do indeed gain federal funding. Yet it is imperative that MSIs comprehensively document 
precisely what they intend to do with the funding and what they hope to achieve through 
their federally funded programs. An emphasis on incentives-based funding and ROI 
reveal that quantifying inputs and outputs will be essential to a successful proposal in the 
years to come. 
Finally, institutions that are designated as MSIs should look to their MSI 
programs as opportunities to scale up such programs. Many MSI programs exclusively 
target a specific population of students depending on the category of MSIs. Hence, not all 
enrolled students in the institution can benefit from the federally funded program. Yet 
there are lessons to be learned that could be applied to the entire school. Paramount 
among these is the approach towards ensuring success on the part of traditionally 
underserved student populations. This is an area at which MSIs have been shown to 
excel. All institutions of higher education can benefit the entire student body based on 
such best practices. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
There are three primary avenues for future research based on this study. First, 
little is known about how institutions go about creating project abstracts or constructing 




valuable function in interrogating how different categories of MSIs approach their project 
abstracts and decisions on what most necessitates the focus of the MSI grant. On the 
other side of the equation, no extant research has trained a lens on how the Office of 
Postsecondary Education reviews MSI project abstracts and makes decisions on awards. 
Either vantage point could contribute immensely to both researchers and practitioners.  
Second, few studies have examined MSI outcomes across different MSI 
categories. Less have employed quasi-experimental quantitative research designs to 
estimate the relationship between the receipt of federal funding and outcomes such as 
degree completion or retention. As explained earlier, policymakers demand an evidence-
based approach towards funding colleges and universities. As flawed as many of such 
funding mechanism have been throughout the states, the increasing popularity of pay-for-
performance in higher education proves the necessity of demonstrating the impact of 
MSIs through rigorous research designs. 
Third, research studies using different methodological strategies are necessary to 
analyze the potential relationship between the embrace of an MSI identity and student 
success. Researchers have only just begun exploring how institutions do and do not 
acknowledge their MSI status. Content analysis could be useful in exploring college 
promotional materials for an indication of whether or not they are an MSI. Quantitative 
studies could reveal potential causal links between such an embrace and outcomes. 
Conclusion 
 
As the number of MSIs continues to grow, it is important to assess how and how 




approaches MSIs take to carry out their federally funded missions. These missions reveal 
what MSIs prioritize in forwarding programs to advance student progress. While MSI 
programs echo strategies to further student success throughout U.S. higher education, 
much remains to be learned about how specifically MSIs have and can continue to 
support students of color through the many layers of U.S. postsecondary education. The 
design of policies at the institutional and public levels must be informed by finer grained 
































Appendix A1:  
 
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all races and all 


















































HSI/Treatment -1.7215 -7.3325*** -4.9704 -1.8921 -8.4563*** -7.8274 -3.8951
0.9374 1.3183 3.0167 1.2191 1.5191 5.1936 3.6047
Latino/a Enrollment 4.9730** 10.7669*** 10.7406* 4.5865* 10.6036*** 16.2709 8.5253
1.6233 1.5369 5.3176 2.1110 1.7710 9.1548 6.3540
Latino/a Enrollment-squared -8.0118*** -7.8597*** -14.2038** -7.5301*** -5.9878*** -18.9187* -14.9553*
1.5566 1.1952 5.2351 2.0242 1.3772 9.0127 6.2554
Constant 8.4347*** 8.2113*** 9.0304*** 7.7695*** 7.5429*** 9.4971*** 7.1901***
0.4197 0.3766 1.4550 0.5458 0.4339 2.5049 1.7385
R-squared 0.0485 0.0001 0.0001 0.0321 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
HSI/Treatment -2.7791* -8.3748*** 30.6308 -2.2685 -8.8418*** 40.9067 39.7752
1.2990 1.5281 61.6218 1.6766 1.7060 80.9984 80.2448
Latino/a Enrollment 8.3757** 12.3605*** -62.8389 6.0320 10.8157*** -84.4747 -81.8426
2.7836 2.1046 131.3431 3.5927 2.3496 172.6431 171.0368
Latino/a Enrollment-cubed -15.2256*** -10.2449*** 98.5944 -11.3057* -6.1314* 135.4692 123.3148
3.8496 2.4423 211.9428 4.9686 2.7266 278.5868 275.9947
Constant 8.6340*** 8.0896*** -7.1678 7.6143*** 7.2529*** -12.6528 -12.5681
0.5666 0.4444 27.3019 0.7313 0.4961 35.8869 35.5530
R-squared 0.0174 0.0001 0.0001 0.0154 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.






Appendix A2:  
 
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on all races and all 
credentials, all races by sector, with Latino/a enrollment interaction term with HSI 
(treatment), Latino/a enrollment squared and interaction term with HSI (treatment), 










































HSI/Treatment -0.3132 -5.6196*** -0.8043 -0.5498 -0.9121 -2.1610 0.4664
0.7332 1.1270 1.1833 0.9490 1.1662 2.0463 1.6490
Latino/a Enrollment 3.1732* 4.8303*** 4.0627* 2.7918 2.2253 6.1729 1.7493
1.2798 0.9667 2.0226 1.6565 1.0173 3.4977 2.8186
Latino/a Enrollment*HSI -4.5083*** 1.9574 -3.6210*** -4.1108** 2.2280 -2.2800 -4.3521***
1.1580 1.0512 0.7912 1.4989 1.1062 1.3682 1.1026
Constant 7.6734*** 6.5880 6.8447*** 7.0322*** 5.1482*** 6.3409*** 4.9407***
0.2827 0.2201 0.4700 0.3659 0.6312 0.8127 0.6549
R-squared 0.0237 0.0001 0.0130 0.0161 0.0001 0.0001 0.0226
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
HSI/Treatment -1.1081 -5.3343*** -3.1309 -1.0599 -6.1845*** -4.2690 -2.5949
0.8413 1.0065 1.8206 1.0899 1.1410 2.9990 2.3602
Latino/a Enrollment 3.9559** 4.8078*** 7.8044* 2.8485 4.0928*** 9.9356 6.8265
1.5103 0.9177 3.2169 1.9565 1.0404 5.2991 4.1703
Latino/a Enrollment-squared*HSI -6.3451*** 2.1423 -7.9604*** -4.8514* 4.6081** -7.0651* -10.4139***
1.5730 1.2993 2.1817 2.0377 1.4730 3.5938 2.8283
Constant 7.8478*** 6.5781*** 7.7177*** 7.0515*** 5.8768*** 7.2056*** 6.1200***
0.3329 0.2083 0.7432 0.4313 0.2362 1.2243 0.9635
R-squared 0.0234 0.0001 0.0001 0.0141 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
HSI/Treatment -1.1896 -5.5347*** -3.8807 -0.9662 -6.3465*** -5.5620 -3.6819
0.8787 1.0433 2.3723 1.1390 1.1819 3.9214 3.0394
Latino/a Enrollment 3.7594*** 5.4161*** 8.9299* 2.2662 4.7581*** 12.2079 8.5142
1.5397 1.0101 4.2126 1.9958 1.1443 6.9634 5.3972
Latino/a Enrollment-cubed*HSI -8.0449*** 1.5776 -13.3980** -5.3361* 4.6448** -14.4835 -17.9658**
2.0682 1.5976 4.6773 2.6808 1.8099 7.7315 5.9926
Constant 7.8077*** 6.7081*** 7.9794*** 6.9287*** 6.0187*** 7.7249*** 6.5109***
0.3399 0.2286 0.9708 0.4405 0.2590 1.6047 1.2438
R-squared 0.0225 0.0001 0.0001 0.0121 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.




Appendix A3:  
 
Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on Latino/a students and 
all credentials, all races by sector, with Latino/a enrollment squared term, with Latino/a 



























Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.






Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.





























-6.0138*** -10.7011*** -21.2698* -5.8447*** -11.1046*** -19.2215* -13.1095*
0.9708 1.3911 8.6013 1.0522 1.4392 8.2315 5.6554
21.7137*** 22.7723*** 48.4567*** 20.4404*** 21.2696*** 43.8847** 31.8627***
1.6812 1.6217 15.1615 1.8221 1.6779 14.5097 9.9688
-24.4064*** -17.7007*** -54.7213*** -23.1888*** -14.9569*** -48.2675*** -39.6096***
1.6121 1.2611 14.9261 1.7472 1.3048 14.2844 9.8141
8.9014*** 7.6204*** 15.4747*** 8.1926*** 6.8531*** 13.6094*** 10.1469***
0.4346 0.3973 4.1484 0.4711 0.4111 3.9701 2.7276
0.4195 0.0001 0.0001 0.3438 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
-8.9374*** -14.0875*** 123.4213 -8.0684*** -13.7193*** 108.9232 95.3465
1.5478 1.8502 244.7198 1.6149 1.8376 214.3512 189.0059
31.2335*** 28.9094*** -250.7215 27.9130*** 25.8502*** -221.0893 -192.4558
3.3169 2.5482 521.6050 3.4605 2.5308 456.8761 402.8541
-44.9323*** -27.3287*** 403.5995 -39.9952*** -22.0815*** 357.6337 303.8801
4.5871 2.9571 841.6916 4.7858 2.9369 737.2413 650.0685
9.3432*** 7.8481*** -50.2227 8.3051*** 6.9264*** -44.5662 -39.0343
0.6751 0.5381 108.4248 0.7044 0.5344 94.9697 83.7403






Fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of Title V on Latino/a students and 
all credentials, all races by sector, with Latino/a enrollment interaction term with HSI 
(treatment), Latino/a enrollment squared and interaction term with HSI (treatment), 












































Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.






Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.






Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001
-1.8551* -7.6633*** -5.1786** -1.8959* -8.2991*** -4.9432** -1.5274
0.7792 1.1692 1.7102 0.8405 1.1860 1.8284 1.3415
16.9593*** 13.9057*** 22.3089*** 15.9363*** 12.4671*** 19.9508*** 13.6066***
1.3601 1.0030 2.9233 1.4671 1.0173 3.1252 2.2931
-14.6264*** -1.9036 -13.0615*** -13.9127*** 0.2282 -9.6826*** -10.8721***
1.2306 1.0906 1.1435 1.3274 1.1062 1.2225 0.8970
6.7357*** 4.9121*** 6.9685*** 6.1376*** 4.2889*** 5.9293*** 4.1263***
0.3005 0.2284 0.6793 0.3240 0.2316 0.7262 0.5328
0.3728 0.0001 0.1339 0.2978 0.0001 0.0001 0.3453
-4.3063*** -8.0688*** -14.0418*** -4.0019*** -8.3484*** -12.0412** -8.8390**
0.9296 1.0724 4.3809 0.9958 1.0713 4.0895 3.1343
19.1082*** 14.2645*** 36.8358*** 17.2906*** 12.6816*** 31.8739*** 25.5542***
1.6688 0.9778 7.7408 1.7876 0.9768 7.2258 5.5381
-20.0302*** -2.5921 -30.2175*** -18.0719*** -0.0780 -24.0847*** -24.9418***
1.7381 1.3844 5.2498 1.8618 1.3830 4.9005 3.7560
7.2185*** 4.9938*** 10.3485*** 6.4501*** 4.3342*** 8.6935*** 6.9074***
0.3679 0.2220 1.7884 0.3940 0.2217 1.6694 1.2795
0.3218 0.0001 0.0001 0.2512 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
-4.4520*** -8.5099*** -17.1392** -3.9690*** -8.7469*** -14.9715* -11.2274*
0.9789 1.1228 6.3365 1.0479 1.1226 5.9125 4.5253
18.1791*** 15.1625*** 41.6181*** 15.9968*** 13.6294*** 36.6219*** 29.1603***
1.7152 1.0871 11.2519 1.8361 1.0869 10.4991 8.0357
-24.8135*** -5.0884** -51.8961*** -21.5284*** -1.9451 -43.2698*** -42.1405***
2.3039 1.7193 12.4932 2.4663 1.7191 11.6573 8.9222
7.0259*** 5.1865*** 11.4566*** 6.1793*** 4.5373*** 9.7878*** 7.7452***
0.3786 0.2460 2.5930 0.4053 0.2460 2.4195 1.8518
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